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Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal
Courts of the District of Columbia
SUSAN Low BLOCH* AND RUTH BADER GINSBURG**
INTRODUCTION
February 27, 2001 marked the 200th anniversary of the federal courts of the
District of Columbia, the courts we know today as the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. The history of these courts is complex, and
sometimes enigmatic. Their names changed no fewer than six times since their
creation; for some thirty years, from 1863 until 1893, the two courts existed as
one umbrella tribunal, named the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.'
The courts' location in the nation's capital and their dual jurisdiction as both
federal and local forums rendered the District of Columbia courts unique
tribunals destined to make substantial contributions to American jurisprudence.
This Essay describes the evolution of these courts from a three-judge circuit
court with both trial and appellate jurisdiction to the two courts whose 200th
anniversary we celebrated this past year.2 It then examines two main themes
characteristic of these unique tribunals. First, as principal reviewers of govern-
ment action, the courts of the District have protected the rule of law against
nonobservance, neglect, or abuse by federal officials. Second, these courts have
responded to the pleas and plight of vulnerable populations within the city,
including African-Americans, women, the poor, the disabled, political protest-
ors, and criminal defendants. While the District's courts were constrained by the
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
** Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
Justice Ginsburg and Professor Bloch jointly developed the themes for this Essay and for the keynote
address delivered by Justice Ginsburg on March 8, 2001 for the Symposium, Bicentennial Celebration
of the District of Columbia Circuit, 204 F.R.D. 499 (2002). In composing the keynote address for the
Symposium, Justice Ginsburg relied in large part on research undertaken by Professor Bloch. Justice
Ginsburg was also aided in preparing her lecture by her 2000 term law clerks Nick Bravin, Robert
Gordon, Goodwin Liu, and Linda Lye. Professor Bloch composed this Essay using the full fruits of her
research, including material that could not be accommodated in the time span of Justice Ginsburg's
lecture. Professor Bloch regularly consulted with Justice Ginsburg, who reviewed drafts of the Essay as
the work progressed. Professor Bloch would like to thank her friend and colleague, Vicki Jackson, for
her support and inspiration, her research assistants, Nathan Daschle, Matthew Dunne, Julie Gurley, and
Eric Parnes, and the Georgetown University Law Center for its generous writer's grants.
1. In 1893, Congress created the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, giving it the appellate
authority of the D.C. Supreme Court. The court of first instance retained the title Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia until 1936, when it became the District Court of the United States for the District
of Columbia. See infra notes 47-48, 58 and accompanying text.
2. For a more complete history, see JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE COURTS OF TE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT (2001); see also, MATrHEW F.
MCGUIRE, AN ANECDOTAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
1801-1976 (1977); E. BARRrr PRETrYMAN Er AL., HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
TE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT IN THE CoUNTRY's BICENTENNIAL YEAR (1976).
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often restrictive laws, traditional habits of thoughts, and customs of the times,
their opinions, particularly those voiced in dissent, sometimes broke new ground
in ways both notable and influential.
I. HISTORY OF THE COURTS
On February 27, 1801, three months after the federal government moved to
the District of Columbia,3 President John Adams signed a bill creating a judicial
system for the District. That formative measure established a circuit court
composed of three judges, commissioned to serve "during good behaviour."4
The following year, on April 29, 1802, Congress instructed that the chief judge
of the circuit court should also "hold a district court," armed with the same
3. In 1790, Congress decreed that the capital would be located in a district not more than ten miles
square along the Potomac River, on land ceded to the United States by Maryland and Virginia. Act of
July 16, 1790, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 130, 130. The statute provided that the government would not actually
move to the Potomac location until December 1800. In the interim, Philadelphia served as the
temporary seat of government. Id. § 5. John Adams was the first President to reside in the District,
moving into the White House on November 1, 1800. But Adams's time there was brief. On March 4,
1801, four months after Adams moved to Washington, Thomas Jefferson was sworn in as President and
moved into the White House. WHITE HOUSE HISTORICAL Soc'y, THE LIvING WHITE HOUSE 15 (1996).
4. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 103, 105. The circuit court was to meet four times per
year, in each of the two counties that composed the District of Columbia, Washington and Alexandria
County. For Washington, the designated dates were the fourth Monday of March, June, September, and
December. For Alexandria, the dates were the second Monday of January, April, July, and the first
Monday of October. Id. § 4, 2 Stat. at 106. Any two of the judges would constitute a quorum. Id. § 3, 2
Stat. at 105. The chief judge's salary was $2000 per year; each assistant judge's salary was $1600 per
year. Id. § 10, 2 Stat. at 106-07. Appeals could be made to the United States Supreme Court if the
matter in dispute exceeded $100. Id. § 8, 2 Stat. at 106. The amount was raised to $1000 in 1816. Act of
Apr. 2, 1816, ch. 39, § 1, 3 Stat. 261, 261. For matters between $100 and $1000, the losing party could
petition a Justice of the Supreme Court who had discretion to allow an appeal, if he believed that errors
in the proceedings of the court "involve[d] questions of law of such extensive interest and operation as
to render the final decision of them by the... Supreme Court desirable." Id. § 2.
In addition to creating the circuit court, the 1801 Act also provided for an orphans' court for each
of the District's two counties to deal with trust and probate matters, Act of Feb. 27, 1801 § 3, 2
Stat. at 105-06, and as many justices of the peace as the President thought "expedient," id. § 11, 2
Stat. at 107. Serving five-year terms, the justices of the peace were responsible for setting bail,
issuing arrest warrants, and trying cases in which the amount in controversy was under $20. Id.
President Adams, in one of his last acts as President, nominated forty-two justices of the peace; the
Senate confirmed these nominations, but some of the commissions were not delivered. Four
nominees who did not receive their commissions sued, thereby launching the case that yielded the
Supreme Court's momentous decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See
discussion infra note 77.
Under the 1801 law, the circuit court was to apply the law and procedures of the state, Virginia or
Maryland, in which it was sitting. Act of Feb. 27, 1801 § 1, 2 Stat. at 103. The court continued in this
manner until the County of Alexandria was retroceded to Virginia. See Act of July 9, 1846, ch. 35, 9
Stat. 35. The 1846 Act provided that the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia in the County of
Alexandria would be abolished upon formal approval of retrocession, id. § 3, 9 Stat. at 36, which
occurred September 7, 1846, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, 1801-1863:
Legislative History, at http://air.fjc.gov/history/uscc/uscc-dc-frm.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002).
While it seems reasonable to assume that Congress took the phrase "during good behaviour" from
Article III of the Constitution, the circuit court's status as an Article HI court was not settled until well
into the next century. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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powers and jurisdiction as those vested in the nation's other district courts.5
As the first associate justices of the circuit court, President Adams appointed
James Marshall, younger brother of John Marshall, the newly appointed Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and William Cranch, President
Adams's nephew. 6 To serve as the court's first chief judge, Adams named and
the Senate confirmed Thomas Johnson. Johnson had served on the United States
Supreme Court from 1791 until 1793. He resigned from that post upon finding
the rigors of riding circuit hazardous to his health.7 He vowed at his resignation
to refuse all future public offices. True to that vow, Johnson declined Adams's
appointment to the circuit court, but not soon enough to allow Adams to
nominate another. Thus, President Jefferson, not President Adams, in fact
5. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 24, 2 Stat. 156, 166. The jurisdiction of the district courts
throughout the country was much narrower than that of today's district courts. See ERwIN C. SuRRENCY,
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND THE HISTORY OF THEIR COURTS 3 (1965).
The Act of April 29, 1802 was not Congress's first effort to create a district court for the District. On
February 13, 1801, in the waning days of the Adams Presidency, Congress passed a sweeping bill called
the Judiciary Act of 1801, which reorganized the federal courts of the country, creating several new
district and circuit courts, among them a district court for the District of Potomac that included the
territory of the District of Columbia. See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 21, 2 Stat. 89, 96. On March 3,
1801, shortly after creating the circuit court for the District, Congress authorized the chief judge of the
circuit court to hold the district court for the district of Potomac. Act of Mar. 3, 1801, ch. 32, § 7, 2 Stat.
123, 124. But on March 8, 1802, the newly elected Jeffersonian Congress, angry that the outgoing
Federalists had created so many new courts and had thereby stacked the judiciary with many new
Federalist judges, repealed both the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the Act of March 3, 1801. See Act of
Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, §§ 1-2, 2 Stat. 132, 132. Section 3 of the March 8 Act revived the judiciary acts
that had been in effect before the passage of the two 1801 acts. Id. § 3. Among other consequences,
these repeals and revivals had the effect of abolishing the district court for the Potomac district. But
Congress did not intend to deprive the District of Columbia of a district court. Accordingly, a month
later, in the Judiciary Act of April 29, 1802, Congress authorized the chief judge of the circuit court of
the District of Columbia to hold a district court for the District twice a year, with the same powers as
other district courts in the country. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 24, 2 Stat. 156, 166.
6. William Cranch was the son of Mary Smith Cranch, the sister of the First Lady, Abigail Smith
Adams. See CONSTANCE MCLAUGHLIN GREEN, WASHINGTON: VILLAGE AND CAPITAL, 1800-1878, at 19
(1962). Well-known as a reporter of Supreme Court opinions, Cranch became the circuit court's chief
judge in 1806 and remained on the court's bench for fifty-four years. He served on the circuit court
from 1801 until 1855, reporting its decisions from 1801 until 1840. PRETrYMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at
I. Cranch was also the Supreme Court reporter from 1801 until 1815, replacing the first reporter, A.J.
Dallas, who reported the Supreme Court's opinions between 1789 and 1800. Both Dallas and Cranch
did this reporting without an official commission. McGuIRE, supra note 2, at 13; Frank D. Wagner, The
Role of the Supreme Court Reporter in History, 26 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 9, 15 (2001). Cranch's report of
Marbury v. Madison has been hailed as "the most significant synopsis by a Reporter of Decisions in
United States Reports." Id. at 17-18 (quoting Paul R. Baier & Henry Putzel, Jr., Double Revolving
Peripatetic Nitpicker, 1980 Sup. CT. HIST. Soc'y Y.B. 10, 13 (interview of Baier by Putzel)).
7. James O'Hara, Thomas Johnson, 1792-1793, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED
BIoGRAPHIES, 1789-1995, at 31, 35 (Claire Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995). Johnson had also turned down
President Washington's 1795 offer to serve as Secretary of State. Id. Unfortunately for the Federalists,
Johnson declined Adams's appointment too late for Adams to pick another chief judge. Johnson,
Cranch, and Marshall, were all confirmed on March 3, the last day of Adams's term. Fed. Judicial Ctr.,
Judges of the United States Courts, at http://air.fjc.gov/history/j udges-frm.html (last updated Feb. 22,
2002).
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named the first chief judge of the circuit court, William Kilty.8 Notwithstanding
Johnson's refusal to accept the appointment, his portrait hangs in the Ceremo-
nial Courtroom of the E. Barrett Prettyman United States Courthouse, home to
the United States federal courts for the District of Columbia. His name also
appears on the marble wall in the lobby of the courthouse, with the designation
"1801-1801 C.J." Art, one might say, sometimes fabricates history.
For most of its first hundred years, the Circuit Court of the District of
Columbia, like other federal circuit courts in the country, operated as both a trial
and an appellate court. Unlike other circuit courts, however, the Circuit Court of
the District of Columbia served not only as a federal court but also as a local or
state court, adjudicating local criminal and civil cases. 9 The court operated with
only three judges and, until the mid-1820's, no building.' In its early years, the
court convened in the basement of the Capitol when the Supreme Court was not
using it;1" when the Supreme Court was in session, the circuit court sat in
boarding houses, private homes, and even taverns. 12
The circuit court retained essentially this structure-a three-judge court that
operated as both a trial and an appellate court 13-until the Civil War, when it
8. Kilty received a recess appointment from Jefferson on March 23, 1801, was officially nominated
on January 6, 1802, confirmed by the Senate on January 26, 1802, and received his commission on
January 26, 1802. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Judges of the United States Courts: William Kilty, at http://air.fjc.gov/
history/uscc/uscc dc frm.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002).
9. See Act of Feb. 27, 1801 § 5, 2 Stat. at 106. Indeed, most of the cases on its early docket
presented issues of local law. See MORRIs, supra note 2, at 21-24. One of the first cases heard by the
circuit court concerned the court's jurisdiction to try a suspect for a theft that had occurred on February
26, 1801, one day before the circuit court was created. The court, in an opinion by Judge Cranch,
concluded that it had jurisdiction. United States v. Hammond, 1 D.C. (I Cranch) 15, 15 (1801). Chief
Judge Kilty dissented without opinion. Id. at 20.
In addition to its judicial docket, the circuit court exercised significant administrative functions such
as appointing constables, granting licenses to operate ferries, and establishing liquor prices for taverns.
MORRIS, supra note 2, at 7. In 1820, because of a significant backlog in the civil caseload of the court,
Congress raised the required amount in controversy from $20 to $50, thereby reducing the civil
caseload from 1300 to 150 cases. Id. at 29. By 1838, the criminal docket of the court had significantly
increased, and Congress created a specialized Criminal Court of the District of Columbia, with appeals
to be heard by the circuit court. Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 192, 5 Stat. 306.
10. The cornerstone for the city hall, which was to house the circuit and district courts, was laid on
August 22, 1820. The judges moved into the building in 1822 even though construction was not
complete until 1849. See F. REGIS NOEL, THE COURTHOUSE OF THE DIs'rICT OF COLUMBIA 16-18, 31
(1939).
11. Because the Supreme Court's docket was fairly modest in the early years, the Court met no more
than twice a year. Moreover, the Justices spent a considerable amount of their time outside of
Washington riding circuit. That left ample time for use of the basement of the Capitol by the circuit
court. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL
STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 137-41 (1978); 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 554, 662-65 (Paul
A. Freund ed., 1971).
12. See McGuRE, supra note 2, at 19; MoIs, supra note 2, at 7.
13. See supra note 4 for some minor jurisdictional changes in the first half of the nineteenth century.
From 1801 until 1840, the court issued 2100 opinions reported by Cranch. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 19.
During the period from 1815 to 1845, the same three judges served on the court: William Cranch for
fifty-four years, James Morsell for forty-eight, and Buckner Thruston for thirty-six. Id. at 17.
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confronted habeas corpus petitions from parents seeking release of their young
sons from underage enlistment in the Union Army. At first, the court faced down
the Army General. When Mr. Lyons sought the release of his son Jeremiah, the
Army asserted that in a national emergency, such as the ongoing Civil War,
military, not civil, law governed and that under military law, infancy was not a
valid reason for discharge. The court rejected the Army's argument and ordered
the General to produce Jeremiah the next day or be held in contempt. Writing for the
court, Judge William Matthew Merrick warned: "At all times, and particularly in
times of war, the civil order should be preserved and made superior to the military.,'
14
Jeremiah was brought to court and discharged from the Army.'
5
Judge Merrick issued a similar writ two weeks later, ordering General Andrew
Porter to release seventeen-year-old James Murphy. President Lincoln thwarted that
endeavor; he commanded the military to refuse to honor the writ and to station a
guard in front of the judge's house.' 6 An angered Judge Merrick thereupon explained
his absence from the bench in a letter he asked to be read publicly:
Armed sentries... have been stationed in front of my house. Thus it appears
that a military officer [Porter] against whom a writ in the appointed form of
law has issued, first threatened with and afterwards arrested and imprisoned
[Murphy's] attorney who rightfully served the writ upon him. [General Porter]
continued, and still continues, in contempt and disregard of the mandate of the
law, and has ignominiously placed an armed guard to insult and intimidate by
its presence the judge who ordered the writ to issue, and still keeps up this
armed array at his door, in defiance and contempt of the justice of the land.
Under the circumstances I respectfully request the chief judge of the circuit
court to cause this memorandum to be read in open court, to show the reasons
for my absence from my place upon the bench, and that he will cause this
paper to be entered at length on the minutes of the court alongside the record
of my absence, to show through all time the reason why I do not, this 22d of
October, 1861, appear in my accustomed place.
17
Judge Merrick's colleagues strenuously objected to the treatment of Merrick.
They ordered that a rule be served upon General Porter to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt for obstructing justice and preventing a judge
from taking his seat. The circuit's Judge Morsell conveyed these sentiments to
his colleagues:
[T]his was a palpable and gross obstruction to the administration of justice, to
prevent a judge of this court from taking his seat because he issued a
14. See MORRIS, supra note 2, at 35 (citing an unpublished manuscript, H. Westwood, Questioned
Loyalty in the District of Columbia Government 7-9 (1986)).
15. See id.
16. United States ex rel. Murphy v. Porter, 27 F Cas. 599, 600 (C.C.D.C. 1861) (No. 16,074a);
MoIs, supra note 2, at 35-36.
17. Murphy, 27 F Cas. at 600-01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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writ... as the law requires .... The court has its duty to do ... the administra-
tion of justice according to law .... If martial law is to be our guide, we look
to the president ... to say so. [I do] not pretend to controvert the right of the
president to proclaim martial law, but let him issue his proclamation. The
judges have their duty to do under the law, and are liable to be punished if
they do not do it. I intend to do my duty, and vindicate the character of this
court as long as I sit here. I am an old man.' 8
The Executive again defied the court's process. The deputy-marshal reported
that President Lincoln had blocked service of the show-cause order on General
Porter and, in fact, had suspended the writ of habeas corpus in the District of
Columbia.1 9 Chief Judge James Dunlop lamented:
[T]hough we do not doubt our power to regard [the response of the deputy
marshal] as insufficient in law, and [to] proceed against the officer who has
made it, [t]he existing condition of the country makes it plain that that officer
is powerless against the vast military force of the executive .... [T]he case
presented is without a parallel in the judicial history of the United States ....
The president, charged by the constitution to take care that the laws be
executed, has seen fit to arrest the process of this court, and to forbid the
deputy marshal to execute it. It does not involve merely the question of the
power of the executive in civil war to suspend the great writ of freedom, the
habeas corpus .... [N]o notice had been given by the president to the courts
18. Id. at 601 (internal quotation marks omitted). The order to show cause was issued to General
Porter on October 22, 1861. Id.
19. Id. On April 27, 1861, President Lincoln authorized General Scott to disregard any writ of
habeas corpus issued to him and to say that the President had suspended the writ in regard to soldiers in
the Army of the United States within the District of Columbia. See Sidney George Fisher, The
Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the Rebellion, 3 POL. Sci. Q. 454, 456 (1888). In
Lincoln's words:
You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any
point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between
the City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington, you find resistance which renders it
necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally or
through the officer in command, at the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to
suspend the writ.
Id. at 455-56 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted); see MARK E. NEE.LY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY,
ABRAHAM LINcoLN AND CivnL LIBERTIES 11 (1991). Several similar orders were issued thereafter for other
regions of the country. Id.; see William Riker, Sidney George Fisher and the Separation of Powers
During the Civil War, 15 J. HIST. IDEAS 397, 402 n. 17 (1954). A year and a half later, on September 24,
1862, Lincoln issued a more general and more formal proclamation, suspending the writ "in respect to
all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort,
camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the
sentence of any court martial or military commission." Proclamation of Sept. 24, 1862, 13 Stat. 730,
730. Ultimately, on March 3, 1863, Congress weighed in, giving the President discretionary power-
power he believed he already had-to suspend the writ during the continuance of the rebellion. Act of
Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755; Fisher, supra, at 456 n.2. These events provoked a lively debate in
the media as to whether the President had the constitutional authority unilaterally to suspend the writ or
whether only Congress could suspend it or authorize the President to do so. Id. at 457-84.
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of the country of such suspension here, now first announced to us, and it will
hardly be maintained that the suspension could be retrospective .... [But] we
have no physical power to enforce the lawful process of this court on [a]
military subordinate[] against the president's prohibition.2 °
The court resolved that, having "exhausted every practical remedy to uphold
the lawful authority of this court," it would issue no further orders and would
close the case. 21 But not before Judge Morsell fired his parting shot:
I wish it understood that notwithstanding the blow levelled at this court,
I... assert the following principles: (1) That the law in this country knows no
superior. (2) That the supremacy of the civil authority over the military cannot
be denied; that it has been established by the ablest jurists, and.., recognized
and respected by the great father of the country during the Revolutionary War.
(3) That this court ought to be respected by every one as the guardian of the
personal liberty of the citizen, in giving ready and effectual aid by that most
valuable means, the writ of habeas corpus. (4) I therefore respectfully protest
against the right claimed to interrupt the proceedings in this case.22
The circuit court's reluctance to bend to the war's exigencies led Lincoln to
suspect the judges of harboring Southern sympathies. Lincoln's response was
bold and immediate: Sack the court. Lincoln convinced Congress to abolish the
District's courts and to establish, instead, "a court.., of judges of national
reputation with positive and strong convictions in accord with the policies of the
administration on all important questions then disturbing the country."23 And so,
in 1863, the tenure of the judges of the circuit court created in 1801 unceremoni-
ously ended, without impeachments to test the judges' "good behaviour.
'
,
24
20. Murphy, 27 F. Cas. at 602.
21. Id.; see MoIs, supra note 2, at 36.
22. Murphy, 27 F. Cas. at 602.
23. McGuiRE, supra note 2, at 45 (as reported by the Evening Star) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
24. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, § 1, 12 Stat. 762, 762-63. Judge Merrick was the judge most
suspected. In the congressional debate on the Bill of Reorganization, Senator Daniel Clark of New
Hampshire called Merrick a "secessionist," CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1139 (1863) (statement
of Sen. Clark); Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts accused him of having a heart "sweltering with
treason," id. (statement of Sen. Wilson). However, as Justice Job Barnard later observed, no charges of
disloyalty to the government were ever lodged against the circuit court's judges. Job Barnard, The Early
Days of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, 36 WASH. L. REP. 30, 30 (1908) (transcript of
speech by Justice Job Barnard, associate justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia).
Moreover, twenty years later, in 1886, President Cleveland appointed Judge Merrick to serve on the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the court that had replaced the District's court on which
Merrick first served. McGuiRE, supra note 2, at 50. Born in 1818, Merrick was sixty-eight at the time of
this appointment.
The propriety and constitutionality of abolishing a federal court were not taken for granted; several
legislators questioned whether Congress could or should abolish a court. Senator Powell of Kentucky,
for example, argued that judges "should not be subject to be turned out or put into office by conventions
and parties. Whenever you do that you degrade the judiciary." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1129 (1863)
2002]
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In its place, Congress created the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
composed of four justices, to replace the three exiting judges. Lincoln's
appointees, not surprisingly, were Republicans from Northern states; indeed,
two of them, George Fisher and Abram Olin, had been members of the
thirty-seventh Congress that abolished the old court and created the new one.26
Modeled on New York's judiciary, the District's new supreme court sat in
"special terms" with one judge conducting trials, and in "general terms" during
which the full bench reviewed single-judge dispositions.27
(statement of Sen. Powell). Senator Davis of Kentucky argued that judges of these constitutional courts could
be removed by impeachment only. Id (statement of Sen. Davis). While Congress has discretion whether or not
to create lower federal courts, that did not give Congress power over the tenure of office of the judges of the
court. In Davis's words: "[I]f that had been the intention of the members of the [Constitutional] Convention, the
tenure of their office would have been 'during good behavior and the continuance of their courts."' Id. at 1136.
For Congress to have this power, Davis said, would undermine the "independence and integrity of the
judiciary... bringing it into the arena of politics, and clothing a succession of political hacks with the ermine of
the judge, according to the rise and fall of parties." Id. But these objections were rejected. Senator Harris of
New York, after initially pretending that the bill was simply to reform the court, id at 1051 (statement of Sen.
Harris), ultimately convinced his brethren that, because Congress has discretion to decide whether or not to
create inferior courts, it has power to abolish them and thereby remove the judges, id at 1137. The bill was
adopted by a vote of 19 to 16. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1140 (1863) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
See generally Barnard, supra, at 30; Walter S. Cox, Reminiscences of the Courts of the District, 23 WASH. L.
REP. 498 (1895) (transcript of speech by Justice Walter S. Cox, associate justice of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia). Notably, all the discussants assumed that federal courts in the District were Article III
courts, a status not clearly established until 1933. See discussion infra notes 55-56.
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1863 § 1. The main differences between the new and old court were the number of
judges and their titles. Each justice could hold a district court similar to United States district courts
elsewhere; each could also hold a criminal court with the same jurisdiction as the old criminal court.
The new statute eliminated the old two-judge quorum requirement. Instead, during "special terms," a
single judge could try a case; these single-judge decisions were reviewable by the entire court during
the "general term." Act of Mar. 3, 1863 § 1.
26. Lincoln appointed David Kellogg Cartter of Ohio as chief justice, and George P. Fisher, a
Republican congressman from Delaware, Abram Baldwin Olin, a Republican congressman from New
York, and Andrew Wylie of the District and formerly of Pennsylvania, as associate justices. All were
strong Lincoln supporters. See McGuiRE, supra note 2, at 46. The appointment of Fisher and Olin raised
no questions under the Ineligibility Clause of the Constitution because both had left Congress before
their appointments. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. They were appointed March 11, 1963, eight days
after their congressional terms had expired. See RECORDS OF THE COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 2-4
(John B. Lamer ed., 1971); Fed. Judicial Ctr., supra note 7.
During this period, Congress also experimented with more home rule for the District, deciding in
1871 to make the District a territory with a number of locally elected officials. See Act of Feb. 21, 1871,
ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419. The experiment lasted only three years and had little impact on the courts in the
District. But there were some dramatic improvements in the quality of life in the District, improvements
that were sorely needed. In 1871, there had been talk of moving the capital to St. Louis, because, as
Horace Greeley noted, the District was "not a nice place to live." MoIs, supra note 2, at 43-44
(internal quotation mark omitted). In 1874, after the District was essentially bankrupt, Congress
abolished the territorial status of the District and eliminated all elected offices. See Act of June 20,
1874, ch. 337, § 1, 18 Stat. 116, 116; The City's Pretty New Face, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2000, at Al.
Instead, the District would be governed by a three-person Commission appointed by the President. See
Act of June 11, 1878, ch. 180, § 2, 20 Stat. 102, 103. See generally STEPHEN J. MARKMAN, STATEHOOD
FOR THE DIsRIcr OF COLUMBIA: IS IT CONSrrrtmONAL? IS IT WISE? IS IT NECESSARY? 87-88 (1988).
27. Senator Harris from New York, the main proponent of the bill, explicitly noted his reliance on
the structure of New York's system. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1052 (1863) (statement of Sen.
Harris); see also Metro. R.R. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 571-73 (1887) (observing that arranging the
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The newly created Supreme Court of the District of Columbia soon encoun-
tered its own challenges from the Civil War and its aftermath. Shortly after
Lincoln's assassination, Mary Surratt and several others were arrested for
conspiring with John Wilkes Booth to assassinate Lincoln and thereafter helping
Booth to escape. 28 They were tried and convicted by a specially created military
commission, the Hunter Commission, established by newly installed President
Andrew Johnson. 29 On June 30, 1865, Mary Surratt and her convicted coconspira-
tors George Atzerodt, David Herold, and Lewis Payne were sentenced to death;
Dr. Samuel Mudd, who had ministered to Booth's wounds, was sentenced to life
imprisonment.3 ° On July 7, the scheduled execution day, Ms. Surratt sought
habeas from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, contending that as
a civilian, she had a constitutional right to a jury trial in a civilian court and that
her trial by a military commission was unlawful.3 ' Justice Andrew Wylie of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia promptly issued the writ,32 but at
11:30 a.m. on July 7, Major-General W.S. Hancock, accompanied by Attorney
General James Speed, announced to Justice Wylie that, by order of the President
court into special and general terms was a system well established in New York and that the statutes
that created the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia were almost identical to those that had
established procedures for the highest court of New York).
As was true of the replaced circuit court, authority to review judgments of the new supreme court
was lodged in the United States Supreme Court, upon writ of error or appeal. Act of Mar. 3, 1863 § 11,
12 Stat. at 764. Initially the jurisdictional amount required for review in the Supreme Court was set at
$1000, but Congress increased the amount to $2500 in 1879. Act of Feb. 25, 1879, ch. 99, § 4, 20 Stat.
320, 321.
28. The alleged conspiracy also included plotting to assassinate Andrew Johnson, William Seward,
and Ulysses Grant. See J. Holt, Charge and Specification Against David E. Herold, George A. Atzerodt,
Lewis Payne, Michael O'Laughlin, Edward Spangler Samuel Arnold, Mary E. Surratt, and Samuel A.
Mudd, http://www.surratt.org/documents/dcharges.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002). The other coconspira-
tors included Mary Surratt's son, John Surratt, George A. Atzerodt, David E. Herold, Lewis Payne,
Michael O'Laughlin, Samuel Arnold, Samuel Mudd, and Edward Spangler. Id. Mary Surratt had met
Booth, a friend of her son, sometime after she had moved to Washington, D.C. to open a boardinghouse
at 541 H St., N.W. in October 1864. See Surratt Soc'y, Mrs. Surratt's Story, at http://www.surratt.org/
su.hist.html (last updated Mar. 5, 1999).
29. The Hunter Commission was created by President Johnson's order of May 1, 1865. The
President ordered that "the Assistant Adjutant-General [W.A. Nichols] detail nine competent military
officers to serve as a Commission for the trial of said parties, and that the Judge Advocate General
proceed to prefer charges against said parties for their alleged offenses." Proceedings of a Military
Commission, http://www.surratt.org/sudocs.htmi (last updated Oct. 2, 2001). Assistant Adjutant-
General W.A. Nichols named Major-General David Hunter to serve as the presiding officer of the
Commission. Id.
30. T.M. HARRIS, ASSASSINATION OF LINcoLN: A HISTORY OF THE GREAT CONSPIRAcY 112-14 (1892)
(Harris had been a member of the Hunter Commission). O'Laughlin and Arnold were also sentenced to
life; Spangler was sentenced to six years. Id. Mary's son, John Surratt, had fled to Canada to avoid
prosecution. See infra note 39.
31. See Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in Behalf of Mary E. Surratt (July 7, 1865),
http://www.surratt.org/documents/Bplact 13.pdf.
32. Justice Wylie wrote, "Let the writ issue as prayed, returnable before the criminal court of the
District of Columbia, now sitting at the hour of ten o'clock A.M., this 7th day of July, 1865." HARRIS,
supra note 30, at 115 (internal quotation mark omitted).
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of the United States, the Major-General would not produce Mary Surratt.3 3
President Johnson had suspended the writ of habeas corpus "in such cases as
this."' 34 The President's order declared: "I, ANDREW JOHNSON, President of the
United States, do hereby declare that the writ of habeas corpus has been
heretofore suspended in such cases as this, and ... direct that you proceed to
execute the order heretofore given upon the judgment of the military commis-
sion, and you will give this order in return to the writ."' 35 The court yielded to
the President's order 36 and, that same afternoon, July 7, 1865, Mary Surratt
became the first woman executed by the United States government.37
Whether Mary Surratt was lawfully tried remains uncertain; indeed, the
underlying question of the military commission's jurisdiction is still sub judice.
Her claim was not frivolous, and Justice Wylie seems to have appropriately
issued the writ of habeas corpus to gain time to determine the lawfulness of her
conviction. In a leading case pending during Mary Surratt's trial but not decided
until the following year, Ex parte Milligan,38 the United States Supreme Court
held that a military court has no jurisdiction in civilian cases, if the civilian
courts are open.3 9 And the civilian courts of the District of Columbia were
definitely open at the time of Mary Surratt's trial. When Dr. Mudd, one of her
co-conspirators, tried to rely on the Milligan decision, however, his effort failed.
Mudd sought a writ of habeas corpus in 1868. In response to his argument that
the Hunter Commission lacked jurisdiction, the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida (where Mudd was imprisoned)40 distinguished Milligan.4 I In
that court's view, assassinating the Commander in Chief during a civil war
ranked as a military offense properly tried by a military tribunal.42 Mudd
33. See Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in Behalf of Mary E. Surratt, supra note 31.
34. HARMs, supra note 30, at 115.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 114-16.
37. Surratt Soc'y, Welcome to the Surratt House Museum, at http://www.surratt.org (last updated
Dec. 19, 2001). Her coconspirators-Herold, Payne, and Atzerodt-were also executed on July 7,
1865. Surratt Soc'y, supra note 28.
38. 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (mem.).
39. Id. at 118-19, 126 ("[1]t is insisted that the safety of the country in time of war demands that this
broad claim for martial law shall be sustained. If this were true, it could well be said that a country,
preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation.
Happily, it is not so."). When Mary's son, John Surratt, was eventually captured in 1867, he was tried
by a civilian jury that split: Eight voted not guilty, four voted guilty. The charges were dropped in 1868.
One may speculate whether the different outcomes reflected the difference in tribunals or the lowering
of passions. Surely, however, the dramatically different endings cannot be attributed to John's being
less culpable than his mother. Both Booth and John Surratt were alleged to be the masterminds behind
the whole plot. Mary, on the other hand, was accused only of being a helper. KAREN ZEINERT, THE
LINCOLN MURDER PLOT 68-69 (1999).
40. Mudd was imprisoned at Fort Jefferson, Garden Key, Florida, until his release in March of 1869.
SAMUEL CARTER II, THE RIDDLE OF DR- MUDD 335-37 (1974).
41. Exparte Mudd, 17 F. Cas. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1868) (No. 9899).
42. See id. ("The President was assassinated not from private animosity, nor any other reason than a
desire to impair the effectiveness of military operations, and enable the rebellion to establish itself into
a Government; the act was committed in a fortified city, which had been invaded during the war ....
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appealed the denial of his habeas petition, but his 1869 pardon by President
Johnson prompted the dismissal of the appeal as moot.4 3 Mudd's 100-year-old
grandson, Dr. Richard Mudd, has kept the controversy alive, asking the current
federal courts of the District of Columbia to order the Army to void his
grandfather's conviction. 44
The federal courts of the District maintained the same structure-one unified
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia-until the 1890s when Congress
questioned the wisdom of having judges participate in appellate review of their
own first-instance decisions. The legislators wondered whether, in the words of
the day, appeals should go "from Philip drunk to Philip sober.",45 Accordingly,
in 1891, Congress separated the trial and appellate functions for most of the
federal courts in the country, making the district courts responsible for trials and
transforming the regional circuit courts into courts with solely appellate jurisdic-
tion.4 6 Two years later, Congress adopted this model for the District of Colum-
bia. The Act of February 9, 1893 continued the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia as a trial court, but "abrogated and abolished" its appellate jurisdic-
tion.4 7 Congress gave the appellate jurisdiction previously exercised by the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to a newly created three-member
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.48
[This] offense [was] a military one... [and] the proper tribunal... was a military one."). The original
records from the Southern District of Florida for this period are lost, so exact pages are not accessible.
But a report of Judge Thomas J. Boynton's opinion appears in an unsourced newspaper clipping
included in the Lincoln Obsequies Scrapbook in the Library of Congress, discovered by James 0. Hall,
and authenticated by Mr. James E.T. Lange and Ms. Katherine DeWitt of the Surratt Society.
43. It appears that Justice Salmon Chase, acting alone as circuit justice, dismissed the appeal, but there is no
record of any opinion, a matter the Mudd family is still investigating. CARTER, supra note 40, at 366 n.6.
44. Mudd v. Caldera, 26 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119, 124 (D.D.C. 1998) (refusing to dismiss the
application as moot and remanding to the Army for reconsideration of the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal). On remand, the Army again refused to overturn the conviction, and Richard Mudd returned to
the district court. This time, District Judge Paul Friedman reached the merits. Distinguishing Milligan
on the ground that assassination of the President violated the law of war, the court concluded that Mudd
was properly tried by a military commission. Mudd v. Caldera, 134 F. Supp. 2d 138, 146-47 (D.D.C.
2001). The case is now pending in the court of appeals. Mudd v. White, No. 01-5103 (D.C. Cir.).
45. See MoPms, supra note 2, at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted); Walter B. Hill, The Federal
Judicial System, 12 A.B.A. REP. 289, 307 (1899).
46. The 1891 law modifying the circuit courts of the country was the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517,
26 Stat. 826. Authority to review their decisions continued to be lodged in the United States Supreme
Court, by writ of error or appeal. Id.
47. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 7, 27 Stat. 434, 435-36.
48. Id. The newly created court of appeals was given the powers of the General Term, as well as the
power to hear and determine appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Patents in interference
cases, and appeals from
all interlocutory orders of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, or by any justice
thereof, whereby the possession of property is changed or affected... and also from any other
interlocutory order, in the discretion of said court of appeals, whenever it is made to appear to
said court upon petition that it will be in the interest of justice to allow such an appeal.
Id. Following the pattern for the country generally, the same recourse to the U.S. Supreme Court was
provided for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. § 8, 27 Stat.
at 436.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:549
President Grover Cleveland's appointments to this new appellate court, like
Lincoln's in 1863, aimed to create a court with a national, rather than local,
character. Cleveland appointed Richard Alvey, a judge for twenty-six years, ten
of them as chief justice of Maryland's highest court; Seth Shepard, a Texas
judge for twenty-four years; and Martin Morris, a law professor from George-
town who had chaired the committee pressing for these reforms restructuring
the D.C. federal courts.49 The new court of appeals was not reticent in exercis-
ing its appellate authority. In its first six months, from June 6, 1893 to
December 4, 1893, it reversed the lower court's judgment in more than one-third
of the cases on its docket.50 That is considerably higher than the modem reversal rate,
which in the last thirty years has ranged from ten to twenty percent.5 '
During the first half of the twentieth century, the nation's capital and the
federal government grew in prestige and power. For much of this period, the
D.C. courts' dockets, with their mixture of local and federal cases, continued to
resemble state court calendars more than the dockets of other federal courts. 52
But even when the District's federal courts adjudicated local cases, they often
set precedents that attracted national adherence. For example, when the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed the question of the admissibility
of expert scientific testimony in a local murder trial in 1923, the court pre-
scribed a test, ultimately known as the Frye test, that became the standard for
the country for much of the rest of the century.5 3
1933 was a signal year for the status of the District's federal courts. One year
49. See MoIs, supra note 2, at 63--64. As observed infra note 65, the fact that the District has no
Senators has historically given Presidents much more leeway in appointing judges to the courts of the
District of Columbia. See Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 159,
165 (1993).
50. See generally 1 CHARLES COWLES TucKER, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF Ta DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA (1894) (reversing judgments in twenty-three of the fifty-nine appeals on
its docket).
51. See the 1979 to 1999 volumes of Management Statistics for the U.S. Courts, by the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts; and the 1970 to 1999 volumes of Judicial
Business of the United States Courts, by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
52. MoRRS, supra note 2, at 88. The federal appeals consisted mainly of patent and trademark
appeals until 1929 when Congress transferred authority to review decisions of the Commissioner of
Patents to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475.
This court was later replaced by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 103, 127, 96 Stat. 25, 26, 37-39.
53. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923). Mrs. Frye had challenged her
conviction for second-degree murder because it was based on the relatively new "systolic blood
pressure deception" test; the court ruled that before evidence in the form of expert scientific testimony
can be introduced at trial, it must first be recognized and have standing in the scientific field. The
"systolic blood pressure deception" test had not yet gained such recognition. Id. This "general
acceptance" test became the prevailing standard nationwide for much of the twentieth century, until the
Supreme Court in 1993 said that the Federal Rules of Evidence had adopted a "not-only-relevant-but-
reliable" standard to replace the Frye "general acceptance" standard for expert scientific testimony.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Martin L.C. Feldman, May I Have
the Next Dance, Mrs. Frye?, 69 TuE. L. REv. 793, 795 (1995) ("For the last seventy years, the common
law approach announced in Frye has been the prevailing standard for admissibility of scientific
evidence.").
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before, the Comptroller General had concluded that a salary reduction passed by
Congress applied to the D.C. federal courts and accordingly lowered the salary
of retired judges of the D.C. Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.54 Daniel
O'Donoghue, a retired associate justice of the D.C. Supreme Court, and William
Hitz, a retired associated justice of the court of appeals, challenged the constitu-
tionality of this decision. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the
retired judges; the reduction was unconstitutional, the Court concluded, because
these D.C. courts were Article III courts and their judges' salaries were there-
fore protected.55 Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland, joined by Justices
McReynolds, Brandeis, Butler, Stone, and Roberts, relied on several consider-
ations: the judges were appointed to serve "during good behaviour"; the indepen-
dence of the judiciary is of prime importance; the close proximity of D.C.
judges to the Congress made these judges' independence all the more important;
and unlike territorial courts, the D.C. Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were
not temporary.56 Chief Justice Hughes, joined by Justices Van Devanter and
Cardozo dissented, concluding that the courts in question were established
under Congress's Article I authority to provide for the governance of the
District of Columbia and thus did not have Article III protection.57
Congress promptly modified the names of the courts to make their Article III
status clear. In 1934, it placed the term "United States" before the name of the
court of appeals-making it the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.58 In 1936, Congress renamed the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, designating it the District Court of the United States for the District
of Columbia.59 Congress further recognized the Article III security of the courts
in 1948 when it explicitly designated the District of Columbia one of the then
eleven judicial circuits of the United States. The court of appeals was named the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the chief
justice became chief judge, and the associate justices became circuit judges.60
The federal courts of the District of Columbia thereby acquired the names by
which they are known today.
Twenty-two years later, in 1970, a significant structural change gave the
54. Legislative Appropriations Act of 1932, ch. 314, § 106, 47 Stat. 382, 401.
55. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 549, 551 (1933). The challenges were initially
brought in the court of claims, which certified the question to the Supreme Court. Id. at 525. Hitz and
O'Donoghue originally brought separate suits, but the suits were subsequently combined because they
involved the same question. Id.
56. Although these same factors applied to the circuit court judges terminated by President Lincoln
and the Congress in 1863, no challenger had brought that matter before the Supreme Court. Several
legislators, however, had raised the question. See discussion supra note 24.
57. O'Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 551-53 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
58. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 426, 48 Stat. 926. Also during this period Congress enlarged the court,
increasing the number of judges from three to five. See Act of June 19, 1930, ch. 537, 46 Stat. 785. In
1938, Congress added a sixth seat. See Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 290, § 2, 52 Stat. 584, 584.
59. Act of June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921.
60. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 41, 45, 62 Stat. 869, 870, 871. In 1949, Congress increased the
number of D.C. Circuit judges from six to nine. See Act of Aug. 3, 1949, ch. 387, § 1, 63 Stat. 493, 493.
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District of Columbia's federal courts their modem character. In the Reform Act
of 1970, Congress created a discrete and complete set of local courts for the
District-the Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.61
These local courts, analogous to state courts, were designed for the adjudication
of local cases. The federal courts were thereby positioned to concentrate on
federal cases and to achieve through them enhanced prominence in matters of
national import. They became specialists in both separation of powers disputes
and oversight of administrative actions taken by the federal agencies burgeon-
ing in number and in business. As the weight of federal cases grew heavier,62
Congress created new federal judgeships for the District. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, originating with three
judges, now has an authorized complement of twelve,63 while the D.C. District
61. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358,
§ 111, 84 Stat. 473, 475 (1970). The Act gave the power to review superior court decisions to the D.C.
Court of Appeals, identifying it as the highest local court for the District of Columbia. Id. Like its state
counterparts, decisions of the D.C. Court of Appeals are not directly reviewable by any federal court
other than the Supreme Court. Id. For a good description of the evolution of the local courts leading up
to 1970, see MORRIS, supra note 2, at 187-89. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court held that these local
courts were Article I, not Article II, courts. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 390 (1973).
While Congress acted on the view that the existing system of criminal justice was "simply incapable
of coping with the local crime problem," 91 CONG. REc. S25554 (daily ed. July 23, 1970) (statement of
Sen. Hruska), there is little doubt that the reform was also sparked, at least in part, by the legislators'
desire to get local cases, especially criminal and mental health matters, out of the hands of Judges
David L. Bazelon and J. Skelly Wright, jurists perceived by the legislators as excessively intervention-
ist. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL PoLITIcs IN THE D.C. CIRcITrr COURT 15, 28 (1999); MoRRIs,
supra note 2, at 233; Patricia M. Wald, Ghosts of Judges Past, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 675, 680-81 (1994).
62. In the early 1970s, the court of appeals docketed about 120 appeals annually. See DIR OF ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS 11 (1974). By the
late 1970s, the number was closer to 400, and by 1985, the number was greater than 600. See DIR. OF
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2 (1993).
63. In 1978, Congress added two seats to the court of appeals, bringing the number of circuit judges
to eleven. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 3, 92 Stat. 1629, 1632. President Carter
appointed Patricia M. Wald, the first woman on the court, and Abner J. Mikva to those newly created
seats. In addition, President Carter appointed Harry T. Edwards to the bench when Judge Bazelon took
senior status and Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the seat vacated upon Judge Harold Leventhal's death. See
Fed. Judicial Ctr., supra note 26. The 1978 Act enlarged the number of seats on the other circuits as
well. § 3. Shortly thereafter, in 1984, Congress added one more judgeship to the court of appeals,
giving the court the twelve seats it has today. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 201, 98 Stat. 333, 346-47. With the addition of this new seat and several
resignations, President Reagan was able to appoint eight judges to the court of appeals, including
Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, Kenneth Starr, Laurence Silberman, James Buckley, Stephen Williams,
Douglas Ginsburg, and David Sentelle. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., supra note 7. President George H.W.
Bush appointed two judges during his four-year tenure: Karen Le Craft Henderson and A. Raymond
Randolph, both appointed in 1990. In his eight years, President William Jefferson Clinton appointed
three judges; Judith W. Rogers and David S. Tatel in 1994, and Merrick Garland in 1997. For a
complete history of the membership of the circuit court, see 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994).
During President Clinton's Administration, Congress questioned whether the court of appeals in fact
needs twelve judges. See Jonathan Groner, Circuit Pick Caught in the Middle: GOP Senator Questions
Need to Fill Vacancy, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 2000, at I (recounting the Edwards-Silberman testimony
before Congress on whether the D.C. Circuit's caseload still warrants twelve judges).
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Court's complement stands at fifteen. 64
The federal courts of the District are notable for their diverse membership,
measured by geography, gender, and race. While the district court judges come
primarily from the D.C. area, court of appeals judges continue to be drawn from
a nationwide pool. 65 For example, J. Skelly Wright came to the D.C. Circuit
from a district court in New Orleans and Karen LeCraft Henderson came from a
district court in South Carolina.6 6 The D.C. District Court was the first federal
district court on which a woman served: Burnita Shelton Matthews was ap-
pointed to that court by President Truman in 1949.67 Spottswood Robinson III,
appointed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964, was the first African-American
on the D.C. District Court.68 Two years later, Judge Robinson became the first
African-American to serve on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
64. The district court also saw a significant increase in its caseload, and the number of judges has
grown from the twelve seats authorized in 1948, see Act of June 25, 1948, § 133, 62 Stat. at 895-96, to
the present number of fifteen. Act of Aug. 3, 1949, ch. 387, 63 Stat. 493; ADemni. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL COURTS 43 (1999). For a complete history of the district court's
membership, see 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1994).
65. More than most circuit courts, this court of appeals has been a national court. In part, because the
District of Columbia has no Senators, Presidents have been able to appoint judges from a national,
rather than a regional, pool. This feature of the court has been evident at least from the time President
Lincoln made his appointments to the newly created supreme court in 1863. See generally Tobias,
supra note 49.
66. J. Skelly Wright was appointed by President Kennedy on March 30, 1962. See Fed. Judicial Ctr.,
supra note 7. Because of his lead role in cases enforcing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and desegregating the public schools in New Orleans, Judge Wright was not a popular figure in
the Fifth Circuit, and many in that community were pleased to see him move to Washington. See J.W.
PELTASON, FIFTY-EIG- LONELY MEN: SOUtHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 221-29
(1971). President Bush appointed Karen LeCraft Henderson in 1990. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., supra note 7.
67. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Laura W. Brill, Women in the Federal Judiciary: Three Way Pavers and the
Exhilarating Change President Carter Wrought, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 281, 284 (1995). Judge Matthews
received a recess appointment from President Truman on October 21, 1949 and began sitting in November
1949. The following year, she was nominated, confirmed, and, on April 7, 1950, received her commission.
Cynthia Harrison, Burnita Shelton Matthews, in WoMEN IN LAw: A BIo-BmuoGxRAFIcAL SouRcEBooK 150,154
(Rebecca Mae Salokar & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 1966); Julia Kazaks, Architectural Archeology: Women in
the United States Courthouse for the District of Columbia, 83 GEo. LJ. 559, 560 (1994). But Judge Matthews
was not the country's first female Article Ill judge. That honor belongs to Florence Allen, who was appointed to
the Sixth Circuit by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1934. Ginsburg & Brill, supra, at 281-83.
President Carter appointed the first woman to be seated on the D.C. Circuit, Patricia Wald. Editor-in-Chief,
Tribute to the Honorable Patricia M. Wald, 52 AnMN. L. REv. 1, 1 (2000). Indeed, President Carter changed
the face of the federal bench. Previously women were appointed to the federal bench only in token numbers,
but President Carter appointed some forty women. Ginsburg & Brill, supra, at 287-88. While that number may
seem unremarkable today, it was unprecedented in its time. Id President Carter also appointed fifty-five
minorities, thirty-eight of them African-Americans. Susan Moloney Smith, Comment, Diversifying the Judi-
ciary: The Influence of Gender and Race On Judging, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 179, 181 (1994). These numbers,
too, were unprecedented. 1d at 182.
68. GERALDINE R. SEGA, BLACKS IN THE LAW 201-02 (1983). The first black federal district judge in
the continental United States was James Benton Parson, appointed by John F. Kennedy to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 1961. ALTON HORiSBY, JR., CHRONOLOGY OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY 177 (2d ed. 1997). The first black on a federal court of appeals was William
H. Hastie, a 1949 Truman appointee to the Third Circuit. SEGA, supra, at 201.
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Circuit,69 and several years later became its first African-American chief judge.70
Two other significant features characterize the composition of the D.C.
Circuit. Many prominent academics have served on the D.C. Circuit, earning
the court the unofficial title "Court of Appeals for the Academic Circuit., 7 And
more Supreme Court Justices have come from the D.C. Circuit than from any
other federal circuit court: Wiley Blount Rutledge, appointed in 1943, Frederick
Moore Vinson in 1946, Warren Earl Burger in 1969, Antonin Scalia in 1986,
Clarence Thomas in 1992, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1993.72
That, in a nutshell, is how these courts came to look as they do today. Now,
we turn to the work these courts have done in the past 200 years. Moving from
structure to content, two themes best describe the work of the D.C. courts:
protector of the rule of law and responder to the pleas of the vulnerable.
II. OVERSEER OF THE GOVERNMENT
Situated in the nation's capital where central officialdom dwells, with the federal
government serving as a litigant in over seventy percent of their cases,73 the federal
courts of the District of Columbia may be characterized as ombudsmen within our
national government.74 They have taken a lead role in carrying out the judicial
responsibilities first described by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madi-
son:7 5 "to say what the law is" and to make sure the government stays within it.
7 6
Ironically, Marbury v. Madison was not brought in these courts, though
hindsight suggests it could have been. William Marbury chose to go directly to
the Supreme Court to seek a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State
James Madison to deliver the commission appointing Marbury justice of the
peace. Looking back, it appears that the D.C. Circuit Court had jurisdiction to
grant the writ-although we do not know whether the court's authority was so
comprehended at the time or whether the circuit court would have granted the
writ.7 7 But had Marbury filed his complaint initially in the D.C. Circuit Court,
69. President Johnson appointed Robinson to the court of appeals in 1966. See Fed. Judicial Ctr.,
supra note 7.
70. SEGA, supra note 68, at 201.
71. During the 1980s, many of its sitting judges had been full-time law professors before they
became judges, and many continued to teach as adjuncts. MoRRIs, supra note 2, at 324. The seven
former academics were Spottswood Robinson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Harry Edwards, Robert Bork,
Antonin Scalia, Douglas Ginsburg, and Stephen Williams.
72. JOSEPH GouLDEN, THE BaCHwARMEPs: THE PRIvAm WoRm OF mHE PowERFUL FEDERAL JUDGES 250
(1974) (calling the D.C. Circuit the "Mini Supreme Court"). In second place is the Sixth Circuit, with five of its
judges going to the Supreme Court. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., supra note 7. They include Howell Edmunds
Jackson, William Rufus Day, Horace Harmon Lurton, William Howard Taft, and Potter Stewart. Id.
73. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword to MORRIS, supra note 2, at xi, xi.
74. See Moius, supra note 2, at 148, 279; Patricia Wald, Life on the District of Columbia Circuit:
Literally and Figuratively Halfway Between the Capitol and the White House, 72 MNN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1987).
75. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
76. Id. at 177.
77. William Marbury filed his claim in the U.S. Supreme Court in the December 1801 Term, even
though the circuit court of the District had already been created, staffed, and in session as early as
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the Supreme Court probably would not have had the opportunity to use the case to
announce that the judiciary has the power to review the constitutionality of executive
and legislative actions.78 Of monumental importance to the courts of the D.C. Circuit,
and to the entire country, William Marbury's choice of forum positioned the Supreme
Court to announce these powers-without ordering anyone to do anything-and the
courts have spent the last 200 years exercising that authority.
A. OVERSEER OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES
Initially, the D.C. courts' role as ombudsmen focused mainly on overseeing
the coordinate branches-the executive and legislative branches. Then, in the
twentieth century, these courts became heavily engaged as well in review of the
actions of the myriad administrative agencies established during and after the
New Deal.
The D.C. Circuit Court's role as ombudsman began to take shape in its first
decade. In 1807, six years after Congress established the Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia as the capital's main tribunal, the United States Attorney
for the District, acting on direct orders from President Jefferson, asked the court
for a warrant to arrest Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartout on charges of
treason. 79 An Army general had accused the two of planning, in collaboration
with Aaron Burr, the seizure of New Orleans and the invasion of Mexico. A
divided court issued the warrant, but Chief Judge Cranch found the evidence
insufficient to establish probable cause and authored a powerful dissent:
In times like these, when the public mind is agitated, when wars, and rumors
of wars, plots, conspiracies and treasons excite alarm, it is the duty of a court
to be particularly watchful lest the public feeling should reach the seat of
justice, and thereby precedents be established which may become the ready
tools of faction in times more disastrous. The worst of precedents may be
established from the best of motives. We ought to be upon our guard lest our
zeal for the public interest lead us to overstep the bounds of the law and the
March 23, 1801. See, e.g., United States v. Hammond, 26 F. Cas. 96 (C.C.D.C. 1801) (No. 15,293);
discussion supra note 9. In hindsight, it seems reasonably clear that Marbury could have filed his claim
in the circuit court instead of trying, unsuccessfully, to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. However, we do not know whether people at the time understood that the circuit court could
issue a writ of mandamus commanding action by the Secretary of State. For discussion of this issue, see
Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery, Why Did William Marbury Sue in The Supreme Court?, 18
CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Mar. 2002).
78. It almost certainly could not have done so in a way that required no one-neither the President
nor the Congress nor the judiciary-to do anything. If Marbury had filed in the circuit court, and if that
court had issued the writ and the Supreme Court affirmed, the case would have established judicial
review over executive actions, but not over legislative actions. Moreover, by mandamusing Madison,
the courts would have given Jefferson and Madison the opportunity to ignore the judiciary. If the circuit
court had denied the writ, and the Supreme Court affirmed, little would have been established. See
Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison,
1986 Wis. L. REv. 301, 335-37.
79. United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189, 1189 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622).
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Constitution; for although we may thereby bring one criminal to punishment,
we may furnish the means by which a hundred innocent persons may suffer.
The Constitution was made for times of commotion. In the calm of peace and
prosperity there is seldom great injustice. Dangerous precedents occur in
dangerous times. It then becomes the duty of the judiciary calmly to poise the
scales of justice, unmoved by the arm of power, undisturbed by the clamor of
the multitude .... In cases of emergency it is for the executive department of
the government to act upon its own responsibility, and to rely upon the
necessity of the case for its justification; but this Court is bound by the law
and the Constitution in all events.8°
Cranch's warning has echoed through the years 8' and began a venerable
tradition in the D.C. federal courts: the leeway afforded the "great dissenter"
whose well-stated views, initially expressed in opposition to the court's judg-
ment, eventually become the prevailing view. 82 In this particular case, "eventu-
ally" was virtually immediately. Shortly after the D.C. Circuit Court ruled, the
Supreme Court reversed.8 3 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall agreed
with Cranch, found the evidence insufficient, and ordered the release of Boll-
man and Swartout.84 Cranch was elated:
Although I have not for a moment doubted the correctness of my opinion, yet
it is a source of great satisfaction to find it confirmed by the highest judicial
tribunal in the Nation. I congratulate my country upon this triumph of reason
and law over popular passion and injustice-upon the final triumph of civil
over the military authority, and of the practical principles of substantial
personal liberty over the theoretical doctrine of philosophic civil liberty. 85
Bollman and Swartout's case was the first of many challenging the D.C.
federal courts to bind the executive branch to the rule of law in "times of
commotion. 86 A few years later, in 1837, the D.C. Circuit Court finally
confronted the question William Marbury had spared it-whether it had the
power to issue a writ of mandamus ordering a cabinet official to perform his
duty. In United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall,87 William Stokes, a government
contractor, sought a writ of mandamus ordering Postmaster General Amos
Kendall to pay the money the government owed Stokes. The Postmaster argued
80. Id. at 1192 (Cranch, C.J., dissenting).
81. For similar views, see Justice Jackson's famous dissent in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 242-48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
82. See discussion infra notes 218-35 and accompanying text.
83. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
84. Id. at 135-37.
85. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SutPRim COURT tN UNITED STATES HISTORY 308 (rev. ed. 1926) (quoting
Cranch) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189, 1192 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622). (Cranch, C.J.,
dissenting).
87. 5 D.C. (5 Cranch) 163 (1837).
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that the court lacked jurisdiction to inquire into the official conduct of the
President and the heads of departments. In Postmaster Kendall's view, only the
President, not the courts, could compel the head of a department to perform
even a mandatory duty. The circuit court disagreed. In the words of Chief Judge
Cranch: "This Court has the power to call before it every person found in the
district, from the highest to the lowest; and it is upon this power that they all
depend for that protection which the law extends over them."' 88 The Supreme
Court affirmed, and Kendall was ordered to pay Stokes. 89 This power, to issue
writs of mandamus ordering government officials to do what the law requires,
has continued to be a weighty part of this circuit's business; 90 for many years,
no other circuit possessed this authority.91
While the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia had occasion in its first
decade to review actions of the executive branch, the successor Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia had occasion in its first decade to review congres-
sional actions. In 1876, a congressional committee subpoenaed Hallett Kilboum
to testify about a bankrupt Washington real estate venture that owed the
government money. 92 When Kilbourn refused to answer the committee's ques-
tions, the House cited him for contempt and immediately jailed him.93 During
his confinement, Kilbourn was indicted under an 1857 law authorizing prosecu-
tion of uncooperative congressional witnesses in federal court for criminal
contempt. 94 Kilbourn petitioned the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that Congress, by investing the courts with
authority to punish contempt, had deprived itself of that authority. The D.C.
Supreme Court agreed and ordered Kilbourn's release.95
Thereafter, Kilbourn filed a false imprisonment suit against several members
of Congress as well as the sergeant at arms, John Thompson, who had arrested
88. Id. at 174-75.
89. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 626 (1838). Three Justices
dissented on the ground that Congress had not given the court the power to issue a writ of mandamus
against an executive official, but all three dissenters agreed with the majority that nothing in the
Constitution prevented Congress from doing so. Id. at 626 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); id. at 641-42
(Barbour, J., dissenting). Justice Catron concurred in both of the dissenting opinions. Id. at 653.
90. See, e.g., Cotonificio Bustese, S.A., v. Morgenthau, 121 F.2d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ("Where
an administrator erroneously holds himself to be without power to consider a claim, relief in the nature
of mandamus generally may be given.").
91. In 1821, in McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821), the Supreme Court had held
that other circuit courts lacked the statutory authority to issue writs of mandamus against government
officials. See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 443, 455 n.62 (1989). Congress finally conferred that power to the other
circuits in the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, § 1(a), 76 Stat. 744, 744
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994)).
92. See Kilboum v. Thompson, 11 D.C. (MacArth. & M.) 401,402 (1883).
93. Kilbourn was "imprisoned for 45 days in the common jail of the District of Columbia." Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 168 (1880) (mem.).
94. Kilbourn, 11 D.C. (MacArth. & M.) at 403 (relying on Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155).
95. Id.
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Kilbourn.9 6 The D.C. Supreme Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the
defendants were protected by the Constitution's "Speech or Debate Clause." 97 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed with respect to all the defendants except
Thompson, concluding that unelected legislative officials have no "Speech or Debate"
immunity.98 Many years later, in 1969, this holding proved pivotal to Adam Clayton
Powell's successful suit against the clerk, doorkeeper, and sergeant at arms of the
House of Representatives, challenging the House's refusal to seat him.99
Reminiscent of the disputes over President Jefferson's arrest of Aaron Burr's
alleged coconspirators, Bollman and Swartout, and President Lincoln's actions
during the Civil War, the crisis created by President Truman's seizure of the
steel mills during the Korean conflict similarly challenged the D.C. courts'
ability to enforce the rule of law. When the United Steelworkers of America
voted to strike in the midst of the war, President Truman, purporting to rely on
his "inherent authority" as President and Commander in Chief, issued an
executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to seize the mills of
eighty-five companies and to continue their production of steel.' 00 The compa-
nies immediately contested the legality of the seizure. District Judge David Pine
rejected the President's assertion of "inherent authority," finding it unsupported
by any constitutional or statutory provision. 01 He ordered the Government to
return control to the companies. 0 2 In Judge Pine's view, "the contemplated
strike, if it came, with all its awful results, would be less injurious to the public
than the injury which would flow from a timorous judicial recognition that there
is some basis for [the Government's] claim to unlimited and unrestrained
executive power." 10 3 The Supreme Court affirmed. 104
96. Id.
97. Id. at 404 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6: "For any Speech or Debate in either House,
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
98. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 189-90. On the merits, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the investigatory
and contempt powers of Congress were limited by the Constitution and could be reviewed by the
judiciary. Id. at 192. Exercising that power, the Court held that Congress did not possess "the general
power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizens," but could inquire only into matters
over which it had jurisdiction. Id. at 190. Because Congress had not contemplated legislation while
investigating the real estate deal, Congress had acted outside its authority in compelling Kilbourn's
testimony and documents. Sergeant at Arms Thompson was ordered to pay $20,000 in damages-a
judgment Congress subsequently paid. See MORRIS, supra note 2, at 54 n.23.
99. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969). When Powell alleged that the House of
Representatives had unconstitutionally excluded him from taking his seat as a duly elected congress-
man and named Sergeant at Arms Leake Johnson as one of the defendants, the Supreme Court
specifically relied on Kilbourn to support the proposition that the fact "that House employees are acting
pursuant to express orders of the House does not bar judicial review of the constitutionality of the
underlying legislative decision." Id. at 504-05.
100. Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952).
101. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 573-76 (D.D.C. 1952).
102. Id. at 577.
103. Id.
104. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952). The case went directly to
the Supreme Court. The court of appeals granted a stay pending the Supreme Court's decision whether
to grant certiorari, but did not rule on the merits. Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582 (D.C.
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The Nixon years gave us Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, and Vietnam War
protestors. Constantly, the D.C. courts were called upon to enforce the rule of
law. When the Washington Post prepared to publish excerpts from the Pentagon
Papers, a forty-seven volume classified study of the origins and conduct of the
Vietnam War, the Government sought to enjoin the publication, asserting that it
would threaten national security.'0 5 District Judge Gerhard Gesell refused to
stop the Washington Post publication, observing that the case presented "a raw
question of preserving the freedom of the press as it confronts the efforts of the
Government to impose a prior restraint on publication of essentially historical
data." 10 6 The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed; the Government had not
proved that publication would irreparably harm the United States, and the
equities favored disclosure.10 7 The Supreme Court agreed, and the Pentagon
Papers rolled off the presses. 10
8
The Vietnam War presented the courts with other constitutional issues. In the
spring of 1971, when thousands of protestors gathered in Washington to engage
in "May Day" demonstrations against the war, the police arrested over 14,000
people for disorderly conduct, violation of police lines, unlawful assembly, and
illegal entry onto public property. 0 9 Having suspended normal field arrest
procedures, the police had no arrest forms, photos, or other evidence of prob-
able cause to support these charges and had to drop them.1 0 The protestors then
commenced a class action seeking to expunge their arrest records, but District
Judge Howard F. Corcoran denied relief."1 The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by
Cir. 1952). For an informative discussion of this case and its history, see MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND
THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977).
105. United States v. Wash. Post Co., No. 71 Civ. 1235 (D.D.C. June 21, 1971) (order denying
preliminary injunction), aff'd per curiam en banc, 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The government
also sought to enjoin the New York Times from publishing the Papers. See United States v. N.Y. Times
Co., 328 F Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (mem.). The name of the study was "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy." See generally THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY V. UNITED
STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (James C. Goodale ed., 1971).
106. Gesell Ruling on Post, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1971, at 10 (providing the text of Gesell's ruling).
107. Wash. Post Co., 446 F2d at 1328. Judge Malcolm R. Wilkey dissented, believing that
publication "could clearly result in great harm to the nation.., the death of soldiers, the destruction of
alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats
to negotiate as honest brokers between would-be belligerents." Id. at 1330 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
Judge George E. MacKinnon also dissented on the ground that "courts are not designed to deal
adequately with national defense and foreign policy." Id. at 1329 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). This
approach was notably different from the Second Circuit's more cautious response when it addressed the
United States's effort to prevent the New York Times from publishing these papers. The Second Circuit
had remanded the case for further in camera proceedings. United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 444 E2d
544, 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (per curiam).
108. Reviewing the actions of the two circuits, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. courts;
both the Washington Post and the New York Times were allowed to proceed with their publications. N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
109. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 444 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
110. Id.
111. According to the court of appeals, the district court denied relief because the plaintiffs had
failed to demonstrate that the prosecution was rooted in harassment or maintained in bad faith. Sullivan
v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Judge Leventhal, reversed; absent contemporaneous evidence, the appeals court held,
the arrests were presumptively invalid under the Fourth Amendment.1 2 On remand,
Judge Corcoran ordered the destruction of all records, reports, photographs, finger-
print cards, copies, and other records resulting from the seizures."1 3
Watergate raised thorny issues for the courts, most dramatically the propriety
of ordering President Nixon to turn over the tapes of Oval Office conversations
regarding an alleged cover-up of the burglary. Rejecting Nixon's claim of
executive privilege, District Judge John J. Sirica ordered the President to
relinquish the tapes to Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. 114 The D.C. Circuit,
sitting en banc, affirmed in a per curiam opinion. 115 Finding no constitutional
basis for presidential immunity from judicial process, the majority concluded
that "[t]hough the President is elected by nationwide ballot, and is often said to
represent all the people, he does not embody the nation's sovereignty. He is not
above the law's commands."' 1 6 Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey concurred in
part and dissented in part.1 17 The Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit's
affirmance. In United States v. Nixon,' 8 the High Court unanimously held that
executive privilege, although it has constitutional status, "must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial."'1 9 The
Presidency had won, but Nixon had lost. Two weeks later, Nixon resigned. 120
112. Id. at 968-73.
113. Sullivan v. Murphy, 380 F. Supp. 867, 869 (D.D.C. 1974).
114. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1973). Judge Sirica recognized that
executive privilege exists but that it is up to the judiciary to decide whether it must yield in a particular
case: "Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers .... Executive fiat is not the mode of resolution." Id. at 5-6.
115. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (opinion joined by
Bazelon, C.J., and Wright, McGowan, Leventhal, and Spottswood Robinson, J.J.).
116. Id. at 711. The President may assert executive privilege, but his assertions are judicially
reviewable. Id. at 715-16.
117. Judge MacKinnon said he would recognize an "absolute privilege for confidential Presidential
communications" on the ground that "the preservation of the confidentiality of the Presidential
decision-making process is of overwhelming importance to the effective functioning of our three
branches of government." Id. at 730 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Wilkey believed that the executive branch, not the judiciary, is the proper arbiter of the scope and
applicability of executive privilege. Id. at 774 (Wilkey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. 418 U.S. 684 (1974).
119. Id. at 713. Nixon did not appeal the original D.C. Circuit opinion and instead tried to convince
the special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, to accept transcripts of the tape recordings, instead of the tapes
themselves. When Cox refused, Nixon ordered him to be fired and triggered a series of resignations
known as the Saturday Night Massacre. Solicitor General Bork finally carried out Nixon's order, an
action subsequently found unlawful by Judge Gesell in Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C.
1973). Popular outrage forced the President to appoint a new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, who
also sought the tapes. Judge Sirica again issued a subpoena ordering the White House to turn over the
tapes. When the White House tried to quash the subpoena, the Supreme Court, on the special
prosecutor's request, expedited the case, bypassed the court of appeals, and, in a unanimous opinion,
affirmed Judge Sirica's order. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 686-87; John P. MacKenzie, Court Orders Nixon to
Yield Tapes; President Promises to Comply Fully, WASH. POST, July 25, 1974, at Al.
120. Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1974, at Al. The crucial piece of
evidence, the so-called smoking gun, was the recording of June 23, 1972, in which Nixon is heard
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The Nixon years also brought to the D.C. courts the question of the criminal
accountability of one "following government orders." Bernard Barker and
Eugenio Martinez were convicted in 1974 of unlawfully breaking into the office
of the psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg, the suspected leaker of the Pentagon
Papers. Baker and Martinez appealed, arguing that they reasonably believed
their mission had been authorized by the federal government. 21 They alleged
that when Howard Hunt, a White House insider, initially solicited them, Hunt
told them "he was working for an organization at the White House with greater
jurisdiction than the FBI or CIA."' 22 Hunt invited them to "become 'opera-
tional"' again and "help conduct a surreptitious entry to obtain national security
information on 'a traitor to this country who was passing.., classified informa-
tion to the Soviet Embassy. ' ' 123 The D.C. Circuit reversed their conviction. Judge
Wilkey said, in his opinion, "I think it plain that a citizen should have a legal defense
to a criminal charge arising out of an unlawful arrest or search which he has aided in
the reasonable belief that the individual who solicited his assistance was a duly
authorized officer of the law."' 24 Judge Leventhal dissented:
[A]ppellants' mistake of law, whether or not it is classified as reasonable, does
not negative legal responsibility.... We should refuse to cut away and
weaken the core standards for behavior provided by the criminal law. Soften-
ing the standards of conduct rather than ameliorating their application serves
only to undermine the behavioral incentives the law was enacted to provide. It
opens, and encourages citizens to find, paths of avoidance instead of reward-
ing the seeking of compliance with the law's requirements.1
25
In the 1980s, difficult separation of powers issues trooped before the D.C.
federal courts, including the validity of the legislative veto, the Balanced
Budget Act of 1985, and the independent counsel law. In all three areas,
thoughtful opinions of the district court and the court of appeals informed the
Supreme Court's final decision. The constitutionality of the legislative veto first
arose in the D.C. Circuit in a challenge to the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.
Under that Act, changes in pricing policy issued by the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC) could take effect only if neither house of Congress
ordering Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman to tell the CIA to block the FBI probe of the Watergate break-in.
Lawrence Meyer, Obstruction of Justice Case Firmed Up by Transcripts, WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 1974, at A 1.
Overall, between January 1972 and January 1975, the D.C. District Court heard more than eighty
Watergate-related cases (forty-seven criminal and thirty-six civil). MORRIS, supra note 2, at 264. Almost
none of these was reversed on appeal. Id.
121. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
122. Id.
123. Id. Hunt had been a CIA operative who played a major role in organizing the Bay of Pigs
invasion; Barker and Martinez had worked with Hunt during that operation. Id.
124. Id. at 954. Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia,
sitting by designation, also voted to reverse the conviction because the defendants had acted in reliance
on a government official's interpretation of the law. Id. at 957 (Merhige, J., concurring in the judgment).
125. Id. at 972 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
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adopted a resolution disapproving the agency action within thirty days.' 1 6 After
the House of Representatives voted to reject a pricing program adopted by
FERC, the Consumer Energy Council challenged the constitutionality of the
veto. 127 The court of appeals ruled for the Council: A legislative veto, the court
declared, "contravenes the constitutional procedures for making law,"'128 violating the
fundamental requirements that legislation be approved by both houses of Congress
and presented to the President. 129 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court, in INS v.
Chadha,130 agreed that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional.' 3 ' Relying on
Chadha, the Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit's decision in the FERC case.
132
Efforts to deal with the budget deficit in the 1980s provoked the next major
separation of powers challenge. The Granm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Bud-
get and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 constructed an elaborate
mechanism aimed at balancing the budget by 1991.133 Congress set maximum
allowable federal deficits for five fiscal years. 1 34 It then provided that if the
federal budget in any year exceeded the specified ceiling, it would be incumbent
upon the Comptroller General, an officer appointed by the President but remov-
able by joint resolution of the Congress, to specify budget reductions designed
to ensure compliance with the deficit goals.1 35 The President, in turn, would be
required to reduce the budget by the amounts set by the Comptroller General. A
three-judge district court-including then-Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia and
District Judges Norma Holloway Johnson and Oliver Gasch-held, in a per
curiam opinion, that the delegation of executive powers to the Comptroller
General, an officer removable by the legislature by a joint resolution, violated
the Constitution's separation of powers.' 36 Again, the Supreme Court agreed,
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1979).
127. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The opinion,
written by Judge Wilkey, was joined by Judges Bazelon and Edwards.
128. Id. at 479.
129. Id.
130. 462 U.S. 919 (1983), aff'g 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
131. Id. at 959.
132. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983)
(mem.). Before the D.C. Circuit had ruled in the FERC case, Judge John Garrett Penn had certified
three questions to the court of appeals concerning the constitutionality of a legislative veto in a different
law, the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. The challenged provision required the Federal
Trade Commission (FrC), after promulgating any final rule, to submit the rule to Congress for review.
The rule would become effective after ninety days, unless both houses of Congress adopted a
concurrent resolution disapproving the final rule. By the time the D.C. Circuit considered the certified
questions, it had decided the FERC case. Relying on its decision in the FERC case, the court of appeals,
en banc, also found this form of two-house legislative veto unconstitutional. Consumers Union of
United States v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam). The Supreme Court
consolidated this case with the FERC case and affirmed both in Process Gas Consumers Group, 463
U.S. at 1216.
133. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-922 (2000)).
134. Id. § 902.
135. Id.
136. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (three-judge court) (per curiam). The
court held:
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affirming the decision in Bowsher v. Synar. '37
In 1988, the D.C. federal courts considered the constitutionality of the
independent counsel law, first installed in the Ethics in Government Act of
1978. 138 In the D.C. District Court, Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson concluded
that the law was constitutional. 139 A divided court of appeals reversed. Judge
Laurence H. Silberman, joined by Judge Stephen F. Williams, held that the
provisions at issue violated the Appointments Clause of Article II, Article III's
provision for an independent judiciary, and Article I's requirement that the
President "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed." 140 Then-Judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg dissented.' 4 ' The Supreme Court agreed with the dissent and
upheld the law.'14 After twenty years of mixed experiences with the measure,
including the controversial investigation of President Clinton by former D.C.
Circuit Judge Kenneth W. Starr, Congress eagerly took advantage of the law's
sunset provision and allowed it to expire in June 1999.143
The Iran-Contra investigation required the D.C. courts to sort out the complexi-
ties created when Congress and prosecutors investigate the same events at the
same time. In July 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a former staff
member of the National Security Council, testified before a congressional
committee under a grant of use immunity.1 44 At the same time, Independent
Counsel Lawrence Walsh was investigating alleged wrongdoing by government
officials and, on March 16, 1988, indicted North. 14 5 Found guilty on three
counts, North maintained that Walsh had improperly used his immunized
We are confident, however, that congressional removal power cannot be approved with regard
to an officer who actually participates in the execution of the laws.... Giving such power
over executive functions to Congress violates the fundamental principle expressed by Montes-
quieu upon which the theory of separated powers rests: "When the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no
liberty; because apprehension may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner."
Id. at 1401-02 (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPiRr OF LAWS, vol. I, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 152 (London 1823)).
137. 478 U.S. 714, 735 (1986).
138. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994)). The
independent counsel law was reenacted several times. Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039; Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-191, 101 Stat. 1293; Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108
Stat. 732 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994)).
139. In re Sealed Case, 665 F Supp. 56, 62 (D.D.C. 1987).
140. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476,487 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
141. Id. at 518 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988). Justice Scalia dissented. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 599; see also Robert Suro, As Special Counsel Law Expires, Power Will Shift
to Reno, WASH. POST, June 30, 1999, at A6 (discussing new role of the Attorney General in White
House investigations).
144. Joe Pichirallo, Lacking Old Luster North Returns to Testify, WASH. POST, July 7, 1987, at Al.
145. Christopher Drew & Janet Cawley, Grand Jury Indicts Poindexter North, Cm. TIn., Mar. 17,
1988, at 1.
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congressional testimony.'4 6 The circuit court reversed North's convictions be-
cause the trial court had failed to conduct a hearing of the kind necessary to
ensure that North's immunized testimony would not be used against him.
147
Thereafter, Congress exercised greater care in coordinating its investigations
with those pursued by prosecutors. 
148
The most recent confrontations between the D.C. federal courts and the
executive branch occurred during the proliferation of investigations centered on
the Clinton Administration. The federal courts of the District grappled with
novel questions of executive privilege, 149 lawyer-client privilege, 50 Secret Service
privilege,' 5 ' and the interaction between grand jury secrecy and the impeach-
ment power of Congress. 152 While wrestling with these trying questions,
the judges also had to make their way daily through the hordes of media folks
and their vanloads of equipment that ringed the courthouse for months.
15 3
146. George Lardner, Jr., North Guilty on 3 Counts in Iran-Contra Affair; Ex-Aide Is Acquitted on 9
Charges, WASH. POST, May 5, 1989, at Al. For a complete report of this investigation, see 2 LAWRENCE
E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATrERS (1993).
147. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam). The court remanded
for the hearing required by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). On remand, Judge Gesell
dismissed the charges pursuant to a motion by Walsh. Haynes Johnson & Tracy Thompson, North
Charges Dismissed at Request of Prosecutor, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 199 1, at Al.
148. See generally Ronald F. Wright, Congressional Use of Immunity Grants After Iran-Contra, 80
MrNN. L. REv. 407 (1995) (discussing Congress's efforts to coordinate its investigations with prosecu-
tors in response to the reversal of North's convictions).
149. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that the
independent counsel demonstrated the need and unavailability required to overcome White House
Counsel's assertion of executive privilege in the investigation of alleged obstruction of justice in the
Paula Jones case); In re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir.), modified per curiam by 121 F3d 729
(D.C. Cir. 1997), discussed in Recent Case, In re Sealed Case, 116 E3d 550 (D.C. Cir 1997), 111 HARV.
L. REv. 861 (1998) (dealing with independent counsel's investigation of Agriculture Secretary Espy's
alleged improper acceptance of gifts). For interesting discussions, see Symposium, Executive Privilege
and the Clinton Presidency, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 535 (2000) and Symposium, The Consittution
under Clinton: A Critical Assessment, 63 Law and Contemp. Probs. 1 (2000).
150. See Lindsey, 158 F3d at 1263 (concerning use of attorney-client privilege by deputy White House
counsel to resist answering questions regarding independent counsel investigation of alleged obstruction of
justice in Paula Jones case); In re Sealed Case, 124 F3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd, Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding that attorney-client privilege survives death of client).
151. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1079, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam); see also When the
Secret Service Talks, N.Y. TnmEs, July 19, 1998, § 4, at 15 (comment by Professor Susan Low Bloch
regarding the oddity of having the Secret Service, rather than the President, assert the privilege).
152. See In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1059, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(vacating district court order issuing writ of mandamus compelling independent counsel to testify at a
show-cause hearing relating to alleged violation of grand jury secrecy rules while investigating alleged
obstruction of justice during Monica Lewinsky probe).
153. Other interesting separation of powers cases in the 1990s included Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d
973 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming district court's refusal to interfere with presidential power to remove a
"holdover" member of the National Credit Union Administration); and Hechinger v. Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority, 36 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding, on remand from Metropoli-
tan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252
(1991), that Congress's statutory amendment "erasing the condition that the Board's membership be limited to
Members of Congress," but "requiring the Authority to select members from lists prepared by the Speaker of
the House and President pro tempore of the Senate" was insufficient to cure constitutional defect).
CELEBRATING THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY
B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
In addition to judging acts of the President and Congress, the D.C. federal
courts have reviewed countless actions of administrative agencies and have
contributed significantly to the development of what we have come to call
"administrative law." 154 The rapid multiplication of regulatory agencies during
and after the New Deal transformed the dockets of the D.C. federal courts so
that by the end of the twentieth century, the D.C. Circuit was reviewing about
one-fourth of all federal agency decisions in the country, far more than any
other single circuit.1 55 Because of the heavy weight of its agency review cases,
the D.C. Circuit is sometimes called the nation's "administrative law court.'
156
Over the years, D.C. Circuit judgments have increased accountability and
transparency in agency decisionmaking. The court of appeals has stood guard
against agency "capture" by the industries being regulated. In a 1960 case, for
example, the court reviewed and reversed a Federal Maritime Board decision
denying a shipping company access to a trade route used by its competitors.
Judge Henry W. Edgerton warned the Board that its duty was "not to [p]re-
serv[e] [the] monopoly" among current competitors, but to consider "the public
interest in ending th[e] monopoly."' 57 Echoing a point made earlier by Judge
Bazelon,' 58 Judge Edgerton reminded the Board that agencies are charged with
protecting the "public," not the private, interest.
159
D.C. Circuit adjudications have also advanced agency accountability by
broadening access to the courts. In 1966, a religious group, the United Church
of Christ, sought to oppose the license renewal of a Mississippi television
station accused of racial and religious discrimination. 160 The FCC held that the
group lacked standing; in the Commission's view, only persons suffering eco-
154. Depending on Congress's preference, agency actions may be reviewed first in the district court
and then by the court of appeals, or, if Congress so specifies, challenges to administrative actions may
skip over the district court and go directly to the court of appeals. Spottswood W. Robinson, The D.C.
Circuit: An Era of Change, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 715, 716 (1987). For some agencies-such as, the
FCC--Congress has made the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit the exclusive forum for judicial
review. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1994).
155. Robinson, supra note 154, at 716 ("About one-fourth of all federal agency reviews in the
United States reach [the D.C. Circuit], and this far exceeds the number in any other circuit.").
156. See MoRis, supra note 2, at 293 (observing that court of appeals emerged as a "national court
of administrative appeals"); Patricia M. Wald, The Distinctive Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to
Admisistrative Law, Keynote Address Before the Section of Administrative Law, ABA (Oct. 1987), in
40 Admin. L. Rev. 508, 509 (1988).
157. Pac. Far E. Line, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Bd., 275 F.2d 184, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Judge Edward A.
Tamm, then on the district court, had granted summary judgment for the Board in an unpublished
opinion.
158. See Clarksburg Publ'g Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 521-22 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("The Commission
does not stand in the position of a 'traffic policeman, with power to consider merely the financial and
technical qualifications of the applicant.' .. . [There must be] a considered finding that the grant will
serve the public interest." (quoting Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950))).
159. Pac. FarE. Line, 275 F2d at 186.
160. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 997-98 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
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nomic injury or electrical interference could challenge a renewal.16' The D.C.
Circuit disagreed, holding that standing to challenge license renewals must
include "those with such an obvious and acute concern as the listening pub-
lic.' 162 "This much," said then-Judge Burger for a unanimous court, "seems
essential to insure that the holders of broadcasting licenses be responsive to the
needs of the audience, without which the broadcaster could not exist."'' 63
Accountability was also the focus of a key 1971 decision, Soucie v. David,164
a suit brought by citizens seeking government documents under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). In a statement later adopted by the Supreme Court,
Chief Judge David Bazelon declared, "The policy of [FOIA] requires that the
disclosure requirements be construed broadly, the exemptions narrowly."' 165
Decisions such as these spurred the birth and development of public interest
groups throughout the nation. 166
Perhaps most prominently, and controversially, the D.C. Circuit-more than
any other court of appeals-has influenced the nature of judicial review of
agency decisions. In the mid-1970s, Chief Judge Bazelon wrote a series of
pathmarking opinions testing agency decisionmaking for procedural adequacy
before allowing the agency's decision to survive "arbitrary and capricious"
review. 167 At the same time, Judge Harold Leventhal introduced a brand of
161. Id. at 997.
162. Id. at 1002.
163. Id.
164. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
165. Id. at 1080 (determining that Office of Science and Technology is an "agency" subject to FOIA
and that a report regarding supersonic transport is a "record" within the meaning of the Act; appeals
court remanded the case for district court decision whether any of the exemptions to FOIA applied).
Judge Bazelon's statement was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 366 (1976).
166. MoRms, supra note 2, at 294; Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity, Administra-
tive Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1389, 1438-42
(2000); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and
Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 224-25 (1996). See also Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 195-96 (D.D.C. 1972), in which a
three-judge district court held that the student organization, SCRAP, had standing to challenge a
proposed rule that would discourage the use of recyclable materials because their members camped and
hiked in the green spaces threatened by the proposal. The Supreme Court affirmed on the question of
standing. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 690 (1973). More recently, however, the Supreme
Court has taken a less relaxed view on issues of standing. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992) (denying standing to wildlife organizations seeking to challenge Secretary of Interior's
interpretation of Endangered Species Act to apply only within United States and on high seas); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 749-50 (1984) (parents of black children who attend public schools lack
standing to sue the IRS to require it to deny tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private
schools).
167. See, e.g., Aeschliman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622, 629 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (holding Nuclear Regulatory Commission's rejection of environmental organization's com-
ments relating to construction permits "arbitrary and capricious"); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (remanding for
additional proceedings by the Commission). Bazelon developed an approach earlier initiated by Judge
Harold Stephens who, in 1938, reversed an FCC decision denying a license to Saginaw Broadcasting
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judicial review that focused on the substance of agency decisions, requiring
courts to ensure that the agency has "take[n] a 'hard look' at the problems
involved in its regulatory task."' 168 As Chief Judge Patricia Wald observed, the
Bazelon-Leventhal debate over the proper focus of judicial review "titillated
academics and administrative lawyers of the time." 1
69
The Supreme Court settled much of this debate in the late 1970s and early
1980s, forbidding courts from requiring procedures beyond those prescribed by
statute 17° and warning judges not to substitute their own judgments for those of
the agency.17' Thus, while the Supreme Court ultimately did not embrace either
the Bazelon or Leventhal approach, the debate between these giants elevated the
Court's comprehension of the diverse considerations at stake. More enduring
than the shifting verbalizations of standards of review, the D.C. Circuit's surveillance
improved the quality of agency decisionmaking generally. Former FCC Chair-
man Richard Wiley specifically credited the D.C. Circuit with upgrading his
agency's performance; the D.C. Circuit, he said, was responsible for encourag-
ing "more careful and thorough Commission consideration of [its] proposed
decision[s].... increased sensitivity to procedural rights of parties, and, finally,
greater responsiveness to our ultimate mandate to serve the public interest."1
72
Company. In Saginaw, Judge Stephens, writing for the court, said the FCC had not provided a "full
statement.., of the facts and grounds for its decision" as required by the Communications Act of 1934.
Saginaw Broad. Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
168. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Compare id.
(questioning the data relied upon by the agency in promulgating regulations for cement-plant emissions
and ordering the agency to address the petitioner's contentions about the data), and Envtl. Def. Fund,
Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (remanding the case to the EPA for consideration of
scientific evidence that had recently become available), with Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority's substan-
tive evaluation of the agency's assumptions and methodology in setting standards for light evaluation
emissions, but finding a basis for remand in the agency's "failure to employ a reasonable decision-
making process").
169. Wald, supra note 166, at 226.
170. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978), the Supreme Court reversed both Aeschliman and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, holding that when an agency has complied with the
statutorily required procedures, the courts may not engraft their own notions of acceptable procedures.
See id. at 558. The Court was notably critical of the circuit court, calling its approach "Monday
morning quarterbacking" and "Kafkaesque." Id. at 547, 557; see also Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee:
The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 345, 371 (describing the D.C.
Circuit's actions, within the realm of administrative law, as "proceeding in a direction not desired by the
Supreme Court").
171. After adopting a variation of the "hard look" doctrine as the way to determine if agency
reasoning is "arbitrary and capricious" in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983) (court must review for rationality substance of agency
decisions, including technical decisions), the Supreme Court instructed courts to show more deference
to agencies' statutory interpretations in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). According to Chevron, courts are to uphold regulations that are based on
permissible constructions of an ambiguous statute, even if the interpretation is not the most plausible
construction or one the court would choose. Id.
172. ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLmCS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 62 (3d ed. 1982) (quoting
Wiley). Wiley made these remarks in a March 18, 1976 speech in Washington, D.C. to the ABA
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The foregoing merely samples the D.C. federal courts' intensive and varied
experiences as overseers of government actions. The courts also confronted
monumental antitrust cases, including Judge Harold Greene's ordered break-up
of AT&T 173 and Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's proposed break-up of Mi-
crosoft, a disposition reversed unanimously by the court of appeals. 174 In
addition, the courts faced landmark broadcasting cases. These include Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,175 a court of appeals decision upholding the fairness
doctrine, which required broadcasters to afford reasonable opportunity for
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance, 76 and Pacifica
Administrative Law Section's 1976 Bicentennial Institute on Oversight and Review of Agency Decision-
making.
The court's prominent role in reviewing agency decisions, as well as in important separation of
powers cases, has led to assertions that its decisions are often political-that how a judge views agency
policy decisions is often dependent on whether the judge was appointed by a Democratic or a
Republican President. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,
2169 (1998); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the
District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300,
316-17 (suggesting court should show greater deference to majoritarian institutions and adherence to
judicial precedents); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REv. 1717, 1771 (1997) (suggesting that Congress should no longer vest exclusive venue to
review important sets of environmental regulations in the D.C. Circuit). But the judges on the D.C.
Circuit strongly disagree with this assessment. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1364 (1998); Patricia Wald, A Response to Tiller and
Cross, 99 CoLuM. L. REv. 235, 258 (1999). The debate continues. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Relationship Between the District of Columbia Circuit and Its Critics, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 797, 802
(1999); Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry
T Edwards, 85 VA. L. REv. 805, 850 (1999).
173. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 225 (D.D.C. 1982) (approving, with modifications,
proposed settlement decree).
174. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam), aff'g in part
and vacating in part 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C.), appeal denied 530 U.S. 1301 (2000). On June 28,
2001, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's findings that Microsoft had violated the antitrust
laws, but vacated the judgment on remedies "because the trial judge engaged in impermissible ex parte
contacts.., and made numerous offensive comments about Microsoft officials in public statements
outside the courtroom, giving rise to an appearance of partiality." Id. Thereafter, the Bush Administra-
tion announced it would abandon any effort to break up the company. The D.C. Circuit's ability to act
unanimously earned high praise from Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times. See Linda Greenhouse,
Divided They Stand; The High Court and the Triumph of Discord, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 4, at I
(contrasting the D.C. Circuit's endeavor to speak with one voice with the current "culture of dissent" in
the Supreme Court). On November 2, 2001, Microsoft and the United States announced a settlement
that Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly will review. Stephen Labaton, U.S. and Microsoft in Deal, but States
Hold Back, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at Al. However, eight states and the District of Columbia have
opposed the proposed settlement and have asked the judge to impose additional restrictions on
Microsoft. Stephen Labaton, 9 States Ask Judge to Put Restrictions on Microsoft, N.Y. TtmES, Dec. 8,
2001, at C1; Steve Lohr, Microsoft and 9 States Spar in Filings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at Cl.
175. 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
176. Id. at 930. Writing for the court, Judge Tamm concluded that the "fairness doctrine" did not
deprive broadcasters of any First Amendment rights:
The American people own the broadcast frequencies. Speaking through their elected represen-
tatives in Congress, they have established a program of licensing the temporary use of
allocated frequencies to broadcasters who meet the standards established by Congress as
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Foundation v. FCC,17 7 in which the D.C. Circuit reversed an FCC ruling
banning the broadcasting of seven "filthy" words during hours children were
likely to be in the audience.1 78 Noteworthy, too, among the First Amendment
cases aired in the D.C. federal courts are campaign finance issues in, and in the
wake of, Buckley v. Valeo 17 9 and pleas by protestors, who regard the nation's
capital as an ideal venue for all manner of demonstrations.' 80 All in all, the
administered thereunder by the Commission. The broadcasters, then, acquire no ownership of
assigned channels but are authorized to use them for the service of the public interest,
convenience, or necessity.
Id. at 924. The court added: "The broadcasters, as public trustees, have an obligation in a democratic
society to inform the beneficiaries of the trusteeship, the public, of the different attitudes and
viewpoints which are held by the various groups which make up the community." Id. at 928. The
Supreme Court affirmed. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 401 (1969). Ultimately, the court
of appeals had to judge the legality of the FCC's decision to abolish the fairness doctrine. See generally
Susan Low Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administrative State: The Fairness Doctrine and Other
Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregulation, 76 GEO. L.J. 59 (1987).
177. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
178. Id. at 13-14. Chief Judge Bazelon, concurring in the opinion, believed that the FCC's ruling
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 18 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Judge Tamm, author of the
principal opinion, found the FCC order overbroad and vague, but declined to rule on its constitutional-
ity. Pacifica Found., 556 F.2d at 18. Judge Leventhal dissented, maintaining that the probable presence
of children in the audience was critical. Id. at 30 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court agreed
with Judge Leventhal and reversed, employing a more relaxed First Amendment test for the electronic
media than for the print media. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
179. 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
180. Three examples indicate the variety of cases in this category. In Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193
(D.C. Cir. 1981), the court entertained a challenge to a law limiting protests on Supreme Court grounds.
Reversing the district court's dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Grace v. Burger,
524 F. Supp. 815 (D.D.C. 1980), a divided panel, with Judge Harry Edwards writing and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg joining, declared infirm on First Amendment grounds a federal statute banning parades,
assemblies, and the display of banners or devices "designed or adapted to bring into notice any party,
organization or movement" on the grounds of the Supreme Court. Grace, 665 F.2d at 1194. Judge
MacKinnon dissented. In his view, "the strong governmental interest in preserving the order and
decorum necessary to assure due process of law and the appearance of justice at the Supreme Court
[justified] the limits placed.., on expressive conduct." Id. at 1206 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part. See United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 184 (1983). The Court held that the sidewalks around the Supreme Court grounds were
public fora and that the statute's total ban on expression in this area was unconstitutional. See id. at 183. It
declined to decide whether the Court grounds other than the sidewalks are a public forum. Id at 178-79.
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per
curiam), an organization seeking to raise the awareness of homelessness sought permission to have a
round-the-clock demonstration in Lafayette Park across from the White House. The National Park
Service permitted the demonstration, but prohibited sleeping at the site because sleeping would violate
park regulations prohibiting camping. Id. at 587. Judge John Pratt granted summary judgment for the
government in an unpublished opinion. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, No. 82-2501, 1982
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17934 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 1982), but the court of appeals, by a 6-5 vote, ruled for the
demonstrators. See Cnty. for Creative Non-Violence, 703 F.2d at 599. The Supreme Court agreed with
Judge Pratt and upheld the regulation as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction on communica-
tive conduct. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984).
In Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court of appeals considered the constitutional-
ity of a D.C. statute that prohibited the display, within 500 feet of a foreign embassy, of signs designed
to criticize or bring a foreign government "into public odium or public disrepute" without a police
permit. Id. at 1452 (citing D.C. CODE § 22-1115 (1981) (repealed 1988)). A majority-Judge Robert H.
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federal courts at the seat of government have carried out their daunting assign-
ments diligently and honorably in holding government accountable both to the
law and to the people government exists to serve.
III. RESPONDING TO THE VULNERABLE
We now turn from the D.C. federal courts' role in holding public officials
accountable under the laws that empower and control government actors, to the
other dominant part of the courts' jurisprudence: their responses to people
striving for fuller recognition of their human dignity. A complete account would
encompass diverse people and groups who have experienced outcast or outsider
status, including African-Americans, women, the poor, political dissidents,
criminal defendants, the mentally ill, gays and lesbians, Native Americans, and
aliens. To keep this Essay within tolerable limits, this Part focuses on two of the
most populous and historically most disenfranchised groups: African-Americans
and women. 18' The unifying idea in cases involving people with minimal
political clout was well stated by Judge J. Skelly Wright in 1972:
It is claimed that judicial review is anomalously undemocratic, and if by that
one means that it is often counter-majoritarian, the point must be conceded.
But in another sense, the courts are the most democratic institutions we have.
... It is in the nature of courts that they cannot close their doors to
individuals seeking justice.
The judiciary is thus the only branch of government which can truly be
said to have adopted Dr. Seuss' gentle maxim: "A person's a person, no matter
how small." 182
A. RACE CASES
During the early years of the nation, the most vulnerable people in the
District-indeed in the country-were slaves. The Circuit Court of the District
of Columbia heard a fair number of slave-related cases, including those brought
by slaves seeking freedom and by owners trying to recover fugitive slaves.
While the court showed some responsiveness to the plight of the slave,'8 3 the
Bork, and Judge Oscar H. Davis of the Federal Circuit-upheld the statute, affirming Judge Oliver
Gasch, id. at 1477; Chief Judge Wald dissented, id. (Wald, C.J., dissenting). Again, the Supreme Court
was aided by the divided opinions. The Court adopted the dissent's position with respect to the display
clause, but upheld the portions of the statute that, inter alia, prohibited groups from congregating within
500 feet of an embassy. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329-32 (1988).
181. The evolution traced here may be indicative of the approach the D.C. federal courts take or will
take regarding other vulnerable populations. For a brief discussion of the courts' response to other
groups, see infra notes 389-92.
182. J. Skelly Wright, No Matter How Small, 2 HUM. RTs. 115, 116-18 (1972) (quoting DR. SEUSS,
HORTON HEARS A WHo 6 (1954)).
183. See, e.g., Chapman v. Fenwick, 5 F. Cas. 477, 480-81 (C.C.D.C. 1834) (No. 2604) (stating that
burden of proving that "manumission by will" would financially damage decedent's creditors lies on
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reality is that the court was effectively constrained by the restrictive laws of the
period and, for the most part, it enforced them. 1
84
Free African-Americans in the District of Columbia, whose numbers were
notable, 185 were significantly limited by "black codes," which required them to
register, carry a certificate of freedom, and post a twenty dollar bond to ensure
their good behavior.186 When these restrictions were attacked, the court's
response was hardly visionary; its judgments coincided less with Skelly Wright's
views and more with the law, climate, and habits of thought of the times. In
1821, when William Costin, a longtime, well-respected black resident of Wash-
ington, was charged with failing to post the required bond, he attacked the law
as unconstitutional, arguing "[tlhat the constitution knows no distinction of
color."187 Chief Judge Cranch interpreted the bond requirement to apply only
prospectively-that is, only to persons who came to the city after enactment of
the requirement.' 88 Thus, long-standing resident Costin prevailed. But before
Cranch ruled for Costin, he rejected Costin's frontal attack on the law. Costin
had argued that the city of Washington lacked authority to prescribe "the terms
and conditions upon which free negroes and mulattos may reside in the city,"
those contesting manumission, not on slave to be freed; otherwise executor could indefinitely postpone
emancipation); United States v. Bruce, 24 F. Cas. 1279, 1280 (C.C.D.C. 1813) (No. 14,676) (holding
that an informal paper, as opposed to the formal deed usually required, could suffice for manumission);
Queen v. Neale, 20 F. Cas. 130, 130 (C.C.D.C. 1810) (No. 11,504) (stating that upon a petition for
freedom, declarations of deceased persons that the ancestor was free may be given in evidence to show
ancestor was in fact free). See also United States v. Mullany, 27 F. Cas. 20 (C.C.D.C. 1808) (No.
15,832), in which the question raised was whether a "free-born negro" could testify in a case "wherein
any Christian white person is concerned." Id. at 20. Cranch interpreted the relevant Maryland statute
narrowly, holding that the race of the witness should not be disqualifying; the pertinent question was
whether or not one was a slave: "[F]ree-born negroes, not in a state of servitude by law, are competent
witnesses in any case .... [C]olor alone does not disqualify a witness .. " Id. at 22.
184. See, e.g., Mandeville v. Cookenderfer, 16 F. Cas. 438 (C.C.D.C. 1827) (No. 9009). In
Mandeville, a slaveowner sued a stagecoach owner for allowing slaves to use the stagecoach to run
away. The court found the stagecoach owner negligent because "[elvery negro is, by a rule of evidence
well established in this part of the country, prima facie to be considered as a slave." Id. at 439; see also
Brown v. Wingard, 4 F. Cas. 438, 439 (C.C.D.C. 1822) (No. 2034) (holding that a slave lacked
competency to contract with his owner for his freedom, thus the contract would not be enforced); Bell
v. Hogan, 3 F. Cas. 107, 107 (C.C.D.C. 1811) (No. 1253) (finding that skin color was prima facie
evidence of slavery; therefore defendant was not liable for assault for seizing Bell, a free black man,
whom Hogan thought was a slave). For a fuller description of the cases during pre-Civil War period, see
CONSTANCE McLAUGHLIN GREEN, SECRET CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL
25-34, 93-94 (1967) [hereinafter GREEN, SECRET CITY]; and CONSTANCE McLAUGHLIN GREEN, WASHING-
TON: VILLAGE AND CAPITAL, 1804-1878, at 141 (1962) [hereinafter GREEN, WASHINGTON].
185. In 1820, the African-American population in Washington, D.C. was more than 10,000, with
forty percent of those free. The total of 10,000 was slightly less than one-third of the entire population
of the District, which then numbered about 33,000 people. GREEN, WASHINGTON, supra note 184, at 141.
By 1860, the District had a population of 14,316 African-Americans, of whom 11,131 were free.
MORRIS, supra note 2, at 20. The District was one of the very few cities in slave jurisdictions where free
blacks outnumbered slaves. Id.
186. See Costin v. Corp. of Wash., 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3266); MORRIS,
supra note 2, at 28 (describing the various restrictive laws).
187. Costin, 6 F Cas. at 613-14.
188. Id. at 614.
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for in Costin's view, Congress could not delegate to the city authority to classify
unconstitutionally.189 Cranch wrote in response to that argument:
Every state has the right to pass laws to preserve the peace and the morals of
society; and if there be a class of people more likely than others to disturb the
public peace, or corrupt the public morals, and if that class can be clearly
designated, it has a right to impose upon that class, such reasonable terms and
conditions of residence, as will guard the state from the evils which it has
reason to apprehend. 190
Several years later, in 1839, the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
upheld the curfew laws that generally prohibited a "free black or mulatto
person" to go out after 10 p.m. without a pass. 191
As discussed earlier, the Civil War period posed many challenges to the
judicial system in the District.1 92 In May 1862, one month after Congress
abolished slavery in the District, 93 and less than four months before President
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, 94 the circuit court resolved the question
189. Id.
190. Id. at 613. See also Carey v. Corporation of Washington, 5 E Cas. 62 (C.C.D.C. 1836) (No.
2404), in which Isaac Carey, a free black man, challenged the constitutionality of a newly enacted law
that limited the ability of blacks to hold shop licenses. Id. at 65. Carey had previously held a valid
license to sell perfume, but under the new law, the city refused to renew his license. Judge Cranch noted that
free colored persons have not the same political rights which are enjoyed by free white
persons, yet they have the same civil rights, except so far as they are abridged by the general
law of the land. Among those civil rights, is the fight to exercise any lawful and harmless
trade, or occupation.
Id. at 66. But Cranch avoided the constitutional question by concluding that the law was void because it
expanded license requirements beyond the limits of the charter. Id. at 63.
191. Nichols v. Burch, 18 F Cas. 187, 188 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No. 10,240). The law allowed one to
travel outside without a pass if going to or from a place of worship or running an errand for his
employer. When plaintiff Nichols was arrested by Burch and subsequently sued Burch for assault,
battery, and false imprisonment, Burch defended on the ground that he was acting to enforce the curfew
law. Finding the curfew and the arrest lawful, the court dismissed Nichols's suit. Id. at 188.
192. See supra Part I.
193. The District of Columbia Emancipation Act, ch. 54, § 1, 12 Stat. 376, 376 (1862), signed by
President Abraham Lincoln on April 16, 1862, freed all slaves in the District of Columbia. The law
provided for immediate emancipation, compensation to former slaveholders from the government of up
to $300 for each slave of loyal Unionist masters, voluntary colonization of former slaves to colonies
outside the United States, and payment up to $100 to each person choosing emigration. Id. § 3, 12 Stat.
at 376-77. Over the next nine months, the federal government paid almost $1 million for the freedom
of approximately 3000 former slaves. Linda Wheeler, The Bells of Freedom Will Ring Again; Celebra-
tion Today Marks the Anniversary of the 1862 D.C. Emancipation Act, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1998, at
D3. The District of Columbia Emancipation Act is the only example of compensated emancipation in
the United States. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTrrrIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 82-83 (1998); BENJAMIN QUARLES, LINCOLN AND THE NEGRO 220 (1962).
This act of emancipation preceded by several months President Lincoln's more general Emancipation
Proclamation. See infra note 194.
194. On September 22, 1862, Lincoln issued a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, relying on
his power as Commander in Chief. 12 Stat. 1267 (1862). On January 1, 1863, Lincoln signed the final
Proclamation. See 12 Stat. 1268 (1863); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 551-52 (Leonard
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whether the Fugitive Slave Law remained enforceable in the District. In United
States v. Copeland,195 Chief Judge James Dunlop held in no uncertain terms
that, notwithstanding the abolition of slavery in the District, fugitive slaves in
the District were to be treated like "all the criminals and fugitives from justice
of all the states in the Union." 196 According to the court, it was its duty, even in
1862, to "insist upon the enforcement of a law which has been enforced for
sixty years."' 97 The decision was one of the last rendered by the circuit court
before its own abolition. 19
8
Radical changes in the law, both nationally and locally, occurred in the
Reconstruction years. In addition to the ratification of the Civil War Amend-
ments, both Congress and the local District of Columbia government enacted
progressive measures prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions such as restaurants, hotels, and bars.1 99 While the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated the federal antidiscrimination law as beyond the authority of Con-
Levy & Louis Fisher eds., 1994). This Proclamation freed those slaves residing in territories in
rebellion; it did not free slaves in the border states fighting for the Union, nor did it free slaves in the
Southern territories under Union control. The passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution
on December 18, 1865, finally abolished slavery nationwide. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; JOHN HOPE
FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 104-05, 155 (1963).
195. 25 F. Cas. 646 (C.C.D.C. 1862) (No. 14,865a).
196. Id. at 646.
197. Id.
198. One year later, the newly created Supreme Court of the District of Columbia considered the
same question in the case of an escaped slave named Andrew Hall and divided 2-2. See In re Hall, 6
D.C. (1 Mackey) 10, 10 (1863). Chief Justice Cartter and Justice Fisher voted in favor of the
slaveowner. In their view, the new court was "essentially... a Circuit Court of the United States,
subject to all the legislation affecting such courts," the Fugitive Slave Law remained applicable to the
District, and therefore the new court had the power and duty to execute it. Id. (opinion of Cartter, C.J.);
see id. at 24 (opinion of Fisher, J.). Justices Wylie and Olin disagreed. Wylie believed the District had
been omitted from the coverage of the Fugitive Slave Law. Id. at 12 (Wylie, J., dissenting). Olin
maintained that the abolition of the circuit court meant no court in the District had the power to enforce
the Fugitive Slave Law. Id. at 29 (Olin, J., dissenting). As the justices announced their divergent
opinions, Hall's owner attempted to settle the case by grabbing Andrew and trying to run off with him.
Fighting broke out in the courtroom. The police separated the parties and brought Hall to the station
house. McGunRE, supra note 2, at 50-51; MORRIS, supra note 2, at 41; Barnard, supra note 24, at 32-33.
Hall won his freedom by enlisting in the Union Army. McGuIRE, supra note 2, at 51. Congress finally
repealed the Fugitive Slave Law in the Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 166, 13 Stat. 200.
199. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, provided for both civil and criminal
remedies, id. § 2, 18 Stat. at 336. The local law, enacted in 1872 by the short-lived Legislative
Assembly of the District of Columbia, see supra note 26, required the owner of any hotel, eating place,
barbershop, or bathing house to serve "any respectable well-behaved person, without regard to race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." Act of June 20, 1872, ch. 51, § 3, 1894 D.C. COMPILED
STATUTES ch. 16, § 150, at 183. Violations were a misdemeanor, punishable by a $100 fine and
forfeiture of the license to operate the offending facility; a new license could not be reissued until one
year after the forfeiture. Id. § 3. The following year, the Assembly elaborated on the law, prohibiting
owners of restaurants and eating places from refusing to treat "any well-behaved and respectable person
or persons as any other well-behaved and respectable person or persons are treated." Act of June 26,
1873, ch. 46, §§ 3-4, 1894 D.C. COMPILED STATUTES Ch. 16, § 154, at 184-85. See generally Phineas
Indritz, Post Civil War Ordinances Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in the District of Columbia, 42
GEO. L.J. 179, 181-87 (1954).
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gress in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,20 the local laws adopted in 1872 and
1873, albeit enforced only sporadically, remained on the books well into the
next century.20' Their validity was tested in 1951, when the District of Colum-
bia charged a restaurant owned by John R. Thompson Co. with a misdemeanor
for refusing to serve "members of the Negro race." Stipulating to the facts, the
defendant argued that the laws in question, first, were invalid when adopted and,
second, even if initially valid, had been implicitly repealed by noninclusion in
the 1901 codification of the D.C. Code. 20 2 The D.C. Circuit, in a 5-4 decision,
agreed with the defendant on both points. Only Congress, not the D.C. Legisla-
tive Assembly, the court ruled, could enact such laws for the District; moreover,
the laws had been repealed by their omission from the District of Columbia
Code of 1901.203 The four dissenters-Judges Charles Fahy, Edgerton, Bazelon,
and George T. Washington-were of the opinion that Congress could delegate
its lawmaking authority, that these laws were valid when enacted and had not
been repealed, and that even unenforced laws retained vitality unless and until
duly repealed. 2° Agreeing with the dissenters, the U.S. Supreme Court held the
local law valid and still in force despite the 1901 codification.20 5
In the first half of the twentieth century, protestors against the city's prevalent
racial segregation appeared before the D.C. federal courts. In the mid-1930s, the
200. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that neither Thirteenth nor Fourteenth Amendment authorizes
Congress to prohibit private discrimination in public accommodations). The Court left open the
possibility that the federal law remains applicable in the District of Columbia, but that possibility was
ruled out in 1913 in Butts v. Merchants & Miners Transportation Co., 230 U.S. 126, 138 (1913)
(holding that the sections of the statute applicable to the District and territories were not severable).
201. GREEN, SECRET CITY, supra note 184, at 96; MORRIS, supra note 2, at 78-79; Phineas Indritz,
Racial Ramparts in the Nation's Capital, 41 GEO. L.J. 297, 304 (1953).
202. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 81 A.2d 249, 250 (D.C. 1951). The Corporation
Counsel brought this case to test the validity of the 1872 and the 1873 laws. See MORRIS, supra note 2,
at 124; Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter and Civil Rights Litigation,
1946-1960, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 822 (1987).
203. John R. Thompson Co. v. District of Columbia, 203 F.2d 579, 592-93 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (en
banc) (Stephens, C.J., joined by Bennett Champ Clark, Wilbur K. Miller, James M. Proctor). Judge E.
Barrett Prettyman concurred because, in his view, the neglected regulations should be deemed to have
lapsed. Id. at 593. The court had before it a judgment of the D.C. Municipal Court of Appeals reversing
a judgment of the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia. The municipal court had quashed the
information filed by the District, believing that the Acts had been repealed by implication; the D.C.
Municipal Court of Appeals affirmed as to the first count based on the 1872 Act, but reversed on the
counts based on the 1873 Act, concluding that the 1873 Act was valid when adopted and had not been
repealed. John R. Thompson Co., 81 A.2d at 256.
204. John R. Thompson Co., 203 F.2d at 598-99 (Fahy, J., dissenting).
205. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 111 (1953). The Supreme Court
concluded that the 1873 Act was valid, but did not decide whether the 1872 Act had been repealed by
the 1873 Act. On remand, the circuit court vacated its judgment and affirmed the judgment of the D.C.
Municipal Court of Appeals, reinstating the claims based on the 1873 Act and concluding that the 1872
Act had been repealed by the 1873 Act. John R. Thompson Co. v. District of Columbia, 214 F.2d 210,
211 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (en banc) (per curiam). But the case was never adjudicated on the merits. On
March 17, 1954, the Corporation Counsel dropped the charges because the suit "had been brought by
agreement between the colored complainants, the District and the restaurant firm and its attorney to test
the validity of the act passed by the now-defunct assembly." Restaurant Racial Case Dropped in Court
Here, EVENING STAR (Washington), Mar. 17, 1954, at B I.
CELEBRATING THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY
New Negro Alliance began a campaign of picketing and boycotting stores that
refused to hire blacks. One of the Alliance's targets, the Sanitary Grocery
Company, sought an injunction against the picketers. 2°6 The Alliance asserted
that the protests were part of a labor dispute and therefore, under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, could not be enjoined.2 °7 Unconvinced, the district court en-
tered the injunction. 20 8 The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that Norris-
LaGuardia did not shield the picketers. 20 9 The picketers were not employees of
the store, so their protest was not a labor dispute; it was a racial dispute, the
appeals court reasoned. An injunction was warranted, that court concluded, to
protect the employer's "free right to choose its employees and to conduct its
business in whatever lawful manner it may elect.' 2 0 The Supreme Court
reversed.21 In the High Court's view, the protestors raised labor issues and
qualified as persons within the compass of the Act; therefore injunctive relief
stopping the picketing was impermissible.21 2
Restrictive racial covenants were at issue in a number of cases running from the
1920s through the 1940s. For the most part, the D.C. courts, in line with the national
213 opattern, enforced such covenants. Typical of the times was John Buckley's suit to
stop the proposed sale of a neighbor's house to a black woman. Buckley urged,
successfully, that the sale violated a covenant never to sell the property to "any person
or persons of the negro race or blood." Both the D.C. Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia rejected the defendants' plea that the covenant
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth.214 There was no discrimination, in the courts'
view, because black property owners could impose similar restrictions.215 The U.S.
Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.216 The same
myopia was evident when several white property owners sought a declaration that the
restrictive covenants in their deeds were no longer enforceable because blacks had
moved into several adjoining properties not covered by such covenants. Refusing to
nullify the restrictions, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia wrote, 'These
206. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 92 F.2d 510, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1937), rev'd, 303
U.S. 552 (1938).
207. Id. at 511 (discussing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113).
208. Id. at 510.
209. Id. at 511.
210. Id. at 512.
211. New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 563.
212. Id. at 559-62.
213. Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time for Keeping; A ime
for Throwing Away"?, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 61, 80 (1998) (observing that racially restrictive covenants
were generally upheld by courts prior to Shelley v. Kraemer).
214. Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 F. 899, 900-01 (D.C. Cir. 1924), appeal dismissed, 271 U.S. 323
(1926). No reported lower court opinion has been located.
215. Id. at 901; cf. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED Liv 75 (Modem Library 1917) (1894) (referring to
"the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridge, to beg in
the streets, and to steal their bread").
216. Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 329-32.
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covenants constitute valid and solemn contracts and should not be lightly set aside." 217
In two restrictive covenant cases reported in the 1940s, both the trial and
appellate courts again upheld the restraints. But, by then, Judge Henry Edgerton
was serving on the court of appeals; 21 8 following the grand tradition initiated by
Chief Judge Cranch, he published thoughtful and ultimately influential dissents.
Dissenting in Mays v. Burgess,2 19 Judge Edgerton declared it "unsound policy
for a court, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, to enforce a privately
adopted segregation plan which would be unconstitutional if it were adopted by
a legislature. '220 Two years later in Hurd v. Hodge,2 2 1 Judge Edgerton, again in
dissent, further aired his view that racially restrictive covenants were unreason-
able restraints on alienation and contrary to public policy. Judicial enforcement
of such restrictions, he insisted, was inequitable and offended both the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.22
The following year, Judge Edgerton's position became the law of the land. In
Shelley v. Kraemer,223 the U.S. Supreme Court held that enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant by a state court violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.224 Consolidating Hurd v. Hodge with Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme
Court ruled that enforcement of racial covenants in the District of Columbia
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which secures the right to own property
free from racial restraints.225
School segregation litigation followed on the heels of the restrictive covenant
cases. In 1947, Marguerite Daisy Carr sought to transfer from Brown Junior
High, an all-black, overcrowded school, to Eliot Junior High, the all-white
school nearer to her home. Her pleas were rejected by the superintendent of
217. Grady v. Garland, 89 F.2d 817, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (en banc). Justice Josiah A. Van Orsdel
wrote for the court, joined by Chief Justice George E. Martin and Justices Charles H. Robb and Duncan
L. Groner. Id. at 817. Justice Stephens dissented, maintaining that the burden on the remaining whites
was too heavy to justify enforcement. Id. at 820 (Stephens, J., dissenting). No reported lower court
opinion has been located.
218. Henry Edgerton was nominated by President Franklin Roosevelt and confirmed on December
9, 1937. PRETrYMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at vii.
219. 147 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
220. Id. at 875 (Edgerton, J., dissenting). When Mrs. Mays refused to leave her house, the district
court held her in contempt and the court of appeals affirmed, Mays v. Burgess, 152 F.2d 123, 125 (D.C.
Cir. 1945), again over Judge Edgerton's dissent, id. 125-28 (Edgerton J., dissenting).
221. 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
222. Id. at 240-43 (Edgerton, J., dissenting). The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27,
27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994)), provided: "[C]itizens, of every race and
color,. . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property... as is enjoyed by white citizens ......
223. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
224. Id. at 20.
225. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 33-34 (1948). The Court relied on the federal statute, not the
Constitution, in the District of Columbia case because it was not until 1954 that the Court read into the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which governs federal actions, an equal protection
component equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment's explicit check on state action. See Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954); infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
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schools, the district court, and, in 1950, a divided court of appeals. 226 "Separate
but equal" was good law, the majority reasoned.227 Judge Edgerton, in another
pathmarking dissent, presented a raft of statistics indicating that the separate
facilities were far from equal.228 But Judge Edgerton had a more fundamental
objection. Laying the groundwork for the Supreme Court's landmark decision
four years later in Brown v. Board of Education,229 Edgerton declared, "'Sepa-
rate but equal' is as much a contradiction in terms as 'black but white': facilities
which are segregated by law solely on the basis of race or color cannot in any
real sense be regarded as equal. ' 230 He became the first federal judge in the
country to conclude that school segregation imposed by law, even if the
facilities could be made equal, nonetheless violates the Constitution:
Independently of objective differences between white and colored schooling,
school segregation means discrimination against Negroes for two distinct
reasons. (1) By preventing a dominant majority and a depressed minority
from learning each other's ways, school segregation inflicts a greater eco-
nomic and social handicap on the minority than on the majority. It aggravates
the disadvantages of Negroes and helps to preserve their subordinate status.
(2) School segregation is humiliating to Negroes. Courts have sometimes
denied that segregation implies inferiority .... One might as well say that the
whites who apply insulting epithets to Negroes do not consider them inferior.
Not only words but acts mean what they are intended and understood to
mean.
23 1
In 1954, in Boiling v. Sharpe,232 a case companion to Brown, the Supreme
226. Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
227. Id. The decision was in line with a much earlier case in which the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld
the finding of a trial judge that a child who had "one-eighth or one-sixteenth... negro blood" but who
had "no physical characteristic which affords ocular evidence suggestive of aught but the Caucasian"
was properly excluded from a white public school. Wall v. Oyster, 36 App. D.C. 50, 51 (1910). The
majority relied on the Supreme Court's 1896 holding in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 539 (1896), that
"separate but equal" was constitutional. Id. at 548. In the view of the Plessy Court:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races-a
distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so
long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color-has no tendency to destroy
the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude.
Id. at 543. Justice Harlan dissented in Plessy. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
228. Carr, 182 F.2d at 23-30 (Edgerton, J., dissenting) (quoting the Strayer Report, a report made to
Congress demonstrating an unequal assignment of school buildings). The majority refused formally to
consider the Strayer Report because it postdated the trial, hence had not been presented to the trial
court. Carr, 182 F.2d at 21. Edgerton maintained that the appeals court could take judicial notice of the
report; moreover, in his view, the inequality was clear without reference to the report. Id. at 31
(Edgerton, J., dissenting).
229. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
230. Carr, 182 F.2d at 32 (Edgerton, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the United States at 12,
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (No. 25)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Carr, 182 F.2d at 32-33 (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
232. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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Court effectively affirmed Judge Edgerton's opinion in Carr. Twelve-year-old
Spottswood Bolling, Jr. and ten other black students sought to transfer from
their run-down school, located across the street from a pawn shop, to a brand
new, all-white school facing a golf course.233 Taking the case immediately after
the district court dismissed it and hearing it in tandem with Brown, the Supreme
Court decided in favor of Spottswood Bolling and his co-plaintiffs.2 34 Brown
and the cases consolidated with it originated in the states and were thus
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's explicit Equal Protection Clause.
Boiling, the D.C. case, added something more. For the first time, the Court read
into the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment an equal protection
guarantee, controlling federal action in essentially the same way the Fourteenth
Amendment controls state action.
After Brown, changes in public attitudes and actions, complemented by personnel
changes on the District's federal courts, contributed to a new jurisprudence. According
to Professor Morris, the liberal wing of the court of appeals, in particular, began to see
itself as "ombudsman to a disenfranchised black municipality., 235
The lingering effects of past racial segregation posed remedial questions in
the 1960s unlike any courts had encountered before. In a 1969 opinion, Judge
236Wright, sitting as the district judge in Hobson v. Hansen, faced such a case.
The District of Columbia, he found, had adhered to policies that perpetuated
segregation. 237 He ordered comprehensive busing. 238 The D.C. Circuit, in a 4-3
decision, upheld Judge Wright's order.2 39 Chief Judge Bazelon wrote:
Opinions may differ as to the source and magnitude of the differences
between the educational opportunities offered by various District schools. But
when the differentiating factor is as clear as overcrowding versus excess
capacity, we agree with the trial court that transportation to level out pupil
density can fairly be required of the school board.24°
Although the D.C. federal courts no longer had local jurisdiction after the
Reform Act of 1970,241 their Capital City location kept them heavily involved
233. Id. at 498.
234. Id. at 500.
235. MoRRs, supra note 2, at 148.
236. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
237. Id. at 419. The defendants were Carl Hansen, who was the District's Superintendent of Schools,
and the District's Board of Education. Id. at 401. All of the district judges were conflicted out of the
case because they had, by the law existing at the time, appointed the Board of Education. (That law has
since been changed.) See ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY
OF J. SKELLY WIGHnT 57 (1984). Accordingly, Chief Judge Bazelon appointed Judge Wright to hear the
case in view of the experience Judge Wright had gained as district judge superintending school
desegregation in New Orleans. See supra note 66.
238. Id. at 511.
239. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
240. Id.
241. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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in endeavors to overcome rank race discrimination's legacy. In 1971, a three-judge
district court, composed of Judges Harold Leventhal, Joseph Waddy, and John H.
Pratt, construed the Internal Revenue Code, in light of the equal protection guarantee,
to preclude tax exempt status for racially discriminatory private schools. 242 The
three-judge court ordered the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to deny tax exempt
status to such schools, and the Supreme Court affirmed.243 About the same time, a
group of black students, citizens, and taxpayers brought a class action to force the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to enforce Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and to disallow federal funding for racially segregated systems of
higher education in ten states.24 Judge Pratt granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs and ordered the Secretary of HEW to investigate such complaints and
commence enforcement proceedings against the noncomplying states.245 The court of
appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed. 246
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 247 entrusted to three-judge panels of the D.C.
District Court authority to preclear changes in election procedures in states and
subdivisions covered by the Act.24 8 Designed to thwart racially discriminatory
election procedures, the Act requires that "covered states and subdivisions"
implement no change in election practices until the Department of Justice or a
three-judge D.C. District Court determines that the change is not discrimina-
242. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164 (D.D.C. 1971). The suit was a class action by black
parents of school children attending public schools in Mississippi. The year before, the three-judge
court had issued a preliminary injunction ordering the IRS to stop according tax exempt status to
racially discriminatory private schools in Mississippi. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1139-40
(D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
243. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (mem.).
244. Adams v. Richardson, 351 F Supp. 636, 637 (D.D.C. 1972). Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act prohibits, inter alia, discrimination in federally assisted programs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). The
ten states at issue were Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylva-
nia, Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia. Adams, 351 F. Supp. at 637.
245. The district court first issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Adams, 351 F. Supp. at
637-42. Thereafter, it issued a declaratory judgment and injunction based on its earlier findings. Adams
v. Richardson, 356 F Supp. 92, 93-94 (D.D.C. 1973).
246. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F2d 1159, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (affirming,
with minor modifications, the district court's order). The case continued for years. See, e.g., Adams v.
Califano, 430 F Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977); Laura Hawkins, Note, The "Adams Criteria": A Threat to
EqualAccess to Higher Education?, 10 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 91, 101 (1984).
247. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1
(1994)).
248. .ld. §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. at 438-39. Under the Act, a state or subdivision is "covered" by the
preclearance requirement if it maintained a voter eligibility test in the presidential elections of 1964,
1968, or 1972 and if voter registration or turnout was less than fifty percent in the previous presidential
election. Id; see also Cynthia Grace Lamar, Note, The Resolution of Post-Election Challenges Under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 97 YALE L.J. 1765, 1767 n.7 (1988) ("The Act originally covered
Alabama, Virginia, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, as well as one county in
Arizona and Hawaii and 39 counties in North Carolina. Coverage was extended in 1975 to include
jurisdictions with over five percent language minorities that, as of November 11, 1982, had election
materials printed only in English, and in which less than 50% of the eligible population voted in the
1972 election." (citations omitted)). For the list of jurisdictions currently covered by section 5, see 28
C.ER. § 51 app. (2000).
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tory. 49 The Act also prohibits "covered states or subdivisions" from using tests
or devices, such as literacy tests, as a prerequisite to voting or registering to
vote.2 50 But it allows these entities to seek permission to reinstate such tests if
they can convince a three-judge court that the tests had not been used to
discriminate against voters on the basis of race or color during the five-year
period immediately preceding their suspension.2
A key early case from New York challenged Congress's effort to enfranchise
people educated in Puerto Rico who had migrated to New York.252 Congress
provided in the 1965 Act that no person who had completed sixth grade in a
United States school in which instruction was in a language other than English
could be denied the right to vote because of failure to pass an English literacy
test.2 53 A divided three-judge D.C. District Court held that Congress had
exceeded its authority.254 Judge Carl E. McGowan dissented, relying on the
special relationship of the United States to its Puerto Rican citizens, the
principal beneficiaries of the literacy test suspension. 255 The Supreme Court
agreed with Judge McGowan; in Katzenbach v. Morgan,256 it upheld the Act's
application to secure the franchise for individuals schooled in Puerto Rico.2 57 In
another landmark voting rights case, a three-judge district court, on which
Judges Wright, Spottswood Robinson, and Oliver Gasch served, denied a North
Carolina county permission to reinstate a literacy test. The court found that the
test risked projecting into the future the impact of decades of segregated,
inferior education for blacks. 8 The Supreme Court affirmed in Gaston County
v. United States. 2
59
The lingering effects of past discrimination further figured in a trying 1975
D.C. Circuit decision involving public employment. In Davis v. Washington,26°
249. Preclearance is far more often sought from the Department of Justice than it is from the D.C.
District Court. As of 1981, only twenty-three cases had been filed in the District of Columbia courts,
from which ten published opinions resulted. By contrast, from 1965 to June 30, 1986, the Justice
Department had reviewed 112,184 submissions. See William Colbert Keady & George Colvin Cochran,
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Time for Revision, 69 Ky. L.J. 741, 753 (1981); Lamar, supra note
248, at 1767 n.10. Similarly, in the 1990s, the Justice Department received about 173,404 requests
compared to only 14 cases in the D.C. District Court. See Voting Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Section 5 Changes by Type and Year, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/votinglsec_5/changes.htm (last revised
Feb. 11, 2002).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1)(C).
251. Id. § 1971(g).
252. Morgan v. Katzenbach, 247 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965).
253. Voting Right Act of 1965 § 4(e), 79 Stat. at 437.
254. Morgan, 247 F. Supp. at 203 (Holtzoff, J., joined by McGarraghy, J.).
255. Id. at 204-05 (McGowan, J., dissenting).
256. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
257. Id. at 658.
258. Gaston County v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 678, 687-89 (D.D.C. 1968). Judge Gasch
concurred, but on the narrower ground that the county had not proved that municipal registrars had not
used the tests in a discriminatory fashion. Id. at 690-95 (Gasch, J., concurring in the judgment).
259. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
260. 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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a divided panel resolved an equal protection challenge to a test for D.C. police
applicants that had a disparate impact on African-Americans, keeping their
numbers on the police force low. 2 6 ' The disparate racial effect of the test, Judge
Spottswood Robinson said, in an opinion joined by Judge McGowan, required
the District to justify it in the manner prescribed for Title VII "disparate impact"
cases. 262 The Supreme Court reversed, holding for the first time that for
plaintiffs to prevail on a constitutional, as opposed to statutory, race discrimina-
tion claim, discriminatory intent must be shown.2 63
The D.C. Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction to review most actions of the FCC
also figured in the circuit's encounters with race discrimination. Most notably,
the D.C. Circuit played a pivotal role in encouraging the FCC to consider racial
diversity in its licensing decisions. In 1973, for example, the court reversed a
license grant and ordered the FCC to provide a comparative "plus" for a black
applicant expected to participate actively in the station's management. 26 The
ordered "plus," the court said, was needed to advance the "public interest" in
access to diverse ideas and expression.26 5 A few years later, the D.C. Circuit,
sitting en banc, held that, when confronted with a well-pleaded claim of
discrimination, the FCC must hear and resolve the allegation before renewing a
license.26 6 Thereafter, the FCC adopted a multifactor licensing system that gave
a "plus" for minority ownership so long as the minority owner would participate
fully in station management. In a 1984 opinion, the D.C. Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the policy, 2 67 stating that "[p]romoting minority ownership,
if linked to minority management, is desirable as a way of increasing the overall
diversity of perspectives represented in the broadcast mass media., 268 Five
years later, in a 1989 opinion, Winter Park Communications, Inc. v FCC,269 a
divided court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of the FCC's use of
261. Id. at 958-59.
262. Id. at 959. Until 1972, government employers were not subject to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. at 958 n.2.
263. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976).
264. TV9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 942 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
265. Id. at 938. The court denied a petition for rehearing en banc, id. at 942 (supplemental opinion
denying petition for rehearing en banc), but Judges MacKinnon, Robb, Tamm, and Wilkey disagreed. In
their view, the consideration of race as a "merit" or "preference" was impermissibly discriminatory. Id.
at 942 (MacKinnon, J., joined by Robb, and Tamm, JJ., dissenting from the denial of petition for
rehearing en banc); id. (Wilkey, J., dissenting from the denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
266. Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 629-30 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (en banc). The court reversed the renewal of a licensee accused of discrimination and ordered the
Commission to investigate further the complainant's charge. Id. at 633. However, in this consolidated
case, the court affirmed the renewal of another contested license. Id. at 635. Judge Spottswood
Robinson dissented from this aspect of the case; in his view, the Commission should have investigated
the charges of discrimination more thoroughly in both cases. Id. at 654 (Robinson, J., dissenting in
part).
267. W. Mich. Broad. Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
268. Id. at 609.
269. 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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"qualitative enhancement" for minority ownership; 270 a divided Supreme Court
affirmed in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.2 7 1
As the divided panels suggest, affirmative action controversies have not been
calmly or evenly adjudicated in the D.C. Circuit. The judges, like the public,
have not been of one mind on the use of race not to subordinate, but to make up
for past discrimination or to promote diversity. The pendulum on the D.C.
Circuit changed direction in Hammon v. Barry.2 72 In that case, in April 1985,
District Judge Charles Richey upheld the District of Columbia Fire Depart-
ment's affirmative action hiring plan,273 but a divided court of appeals panel
reversed.274 Judge Starr, joined by Judge Silberman, pointed to three flaws in
the District's case: The District had not shown "present day impediments to
black hiring,'275 it had not considered nonrace-based alternatives, and it relied
on a constitutionally impermissible goal of achieving racial parity.2 76 Judge
Mikva dissented, chastising the majority for ignoring the long history of discrimi-
nation by the Fire Department; that history included separate black and white
companies until 1962 and continued widespread segregation within D.C. fire
houses through the early 1970s.277
Shortly after the divided D.C. Circuit decision in Hammon, the Supreme
Court, in Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency,278 upheld a local
government's affirmative action hiring plan. Denying a petition to rehear Ham-
mon, the D.C. Circuit panel found that Johnson would not alter the panel's
judgment.2 79 Judge Mikva again dissented. 280 The en banc court then granted
rehearing,2 8 but later, without explanation, revoked its decision.282 This prompted
another sharp dissent by Judge Mikva, this time joined by Chief Judge Wald and
Judges Spottswood Robinson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Edwards.283 The
270. Id. at 353. Winter Park Communications and Metro Broadcasting were unsuccessful applicants
who challenged the FCC's decision to award a license to Rainbow Broadcasting Company, in part,
because of its minority ownership. Judge Edwards, joined by Judge Daniel M. Friedman of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation, relied on West Michigan Broadcasting
and denied review. Id. at 355. Judge Williams concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 356
(Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
271. 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990).
272. 606 E Supp. 1082 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd, 813 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
273. Id. at 1095. Judge Richey found that the part of the plan dealing with promotion violated Title
VII. Id. at 1099. That aspect of the opinion was not appealed. Both the hiring and the promotion plans
had been developed by the Fire Department pursuant to a consent decree. Id. at 1086.
274. Hammon, 813 F.2d at 431-32.
275. Id. at 428.
276. Id. at 431-32.
277. Id. at 433-35 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
278. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
279. Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
280. Id. at 88 (Mikva, J., dissenting from the denial of petition for rehearing).
281. Hammon v. Barry, 833 F.2d 367, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam).
282. Hammon v. Barry, 841 F.2d 426, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam).
283. Id. (Mikva, J., dissenting from the unexplained vacation of order granting rehearing en banc).
The dissenting judges said, "The question presented in this case is too important to leave in its present
unsatisfactory state in this circuit . I..." Id. Hammon was the case that allegedly provoked a heated
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court's internal division became even more apparent the next year when a
different divided panel, in Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC,284
held unconstitutional the FCC's policy of favoring minorities in its distress sale
programs.285 The Supreme Court agreed with the dissent; consolidating Shur-
berg with Metro Broadcasting, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld these
affirmative action plans.286
The life of Winter Park and Metro Broadcasting proved short. In 1995, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,287 the Supreme Court, again by a 5-4 vote, overruled
Metro Broadcasting's holding that intermediate scrutiny applied to affirmative action
programs adopted by the federal government.288 Instead, the Supreme Court held that
strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for all racial classifications,
whether adopted by the local, state, or federal government.289 The majorities in
Shurberg and Hammon had prevailed, at least for now.290 Whatever side one takes in
the affirmative action debate, all would agree that irrational prejudice, even rank
discrimination based on race, have not vanished in the United States and are infec-
tious in our world. In this reality, as well as the determination to counter it at home
and abroad, we all share.29 t
B. GENDER CASES
In the nineteenth century, a variety of complaints concerning the status
of women were litigated in the D.C. federal courts. Initially, the common-
law tradition held sway. In 1869, Congress enacted a Married Woman's Act
for the District; the Act allowed women to hold property separate and apart
dispute between Judges Silberman and Mikva. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C.
CIRcurr COURT 6 (1999); Ann Pelham, Silberman, Dogged by Story, Provides Details of Outburst,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1991, at 7.
284. 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
285. Id. at 902-03. Under the FCC's policies, a licensee whose license renewal had been called into
question could bypass comparative hearing procedures by assigning or transferring the license to a
minority-owned recipient. Shurberg Broadcasting urged that the policy denied it equal protection.
Judges Silberman, id. at 903 (opinion of Silberman, J.), and MacKinnon agreed, id. at 926 (opinion of
MacKinnon, J.). Judge Wald dissented. Id. at 934 (Wald, J., dissenting).
286. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990). While citing Metro Broadcasting, the
court of appeals, in an opinion by then-Judge Thomas, held unconstitutional the FCC's policy of giving
"extra credit" to female applicants in the licensing decisions. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (holding preference for women owners not substantially related to achieving diversity on air
waves). Chief Judge Mikva dissented. Id. at 404 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
287. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
288. Id. at 227.
289. Id. at 236 ("We think that requiring strict scrutiny is the best way to ensure that courts will
consistently give racial classifications ... detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means.").
290. For a recent application of Adarand to the FCC's equal employment opportunity regulations,
see Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 351-55 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding FCC's
regulations unconstitutional). To date, the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to apply the
Adarand test.
291. For a helpful overview of the Supreme Court's approach to affirmative action, see generally
Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights
Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 253 (1999).
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from their husbands.2 9 2 In its early interpretations, the D.C. Supreme Court
read the Act narrowly. 293 When the creditors of George Seitz, in the early
1870s, sought satisfaction of George's debt by reaching a house held in the
name of his wife, Mary Seitz, the Seitzes resisted, maintaining that Mary
had paid for the house entirely out of her own earnings. George's creditors
nevertheless prevailed. The legislation let Mary hold the property, the D.C.
Supreme Court said, but left untouched the common-law rule that a wife's
earnings belong to her husband.294 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.295
The D.C. Supreme Court continued to interpret the Act narrowly 296 until Congress
amended it in 1896 to describe more precisely the classes of property qualifying for
placement in the wife's separate estate.297 In one of the first cases after the 1896
amendment, the newly created D.C. Court of Appeals held that a married woman
running a business may maintain a libel suit in her own name without joining her
husband.298 The amended Act did not abandon completely the common-law disabili-
ties imposed on married women, the court cautioned, but it did enlarge the scope of
the separate estate women may hold and it gave them control of their earnings.
299
Three years later, the D.C. Court of Appeals spoke more expansively:
[Ilt was the purpose of Congress in the act of June 1, 1896, to restore to married
women, or rather to continue in them, the power, which they had before marriage
and would have in the absence of the marital relation, freely to control their own
persons and their own actions; to remove and destroy the common law authority of
their husbands, so far as that authority rested upon mere force; and to leave the
marital relation to be supported by the power of affection alone.3
292. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 23, 16 Stat. 45. The Act provided: "The right of any married woman
to any property, personal or real, acquired during marriage in any other way than by gift or conveyance
from her husband, shall be as absolute as if she were femme sole, and shall not be subject to the
disposal of the husband, nor be liable for his debts." Id. § 1, 16 Stat. at 45. The Act further provided that
"any married woman may contract, and sue and be sued, in her own name, in all matters having relation
to her sole and separate property in the same manner as if she were unmarried." Id.
293. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Seitz, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 480 (1874).
294. Id. at 483.
295. Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U.S. 580, 582-83 (1876) (stating that while statute had modified a
husband's common-law right to absolute ownership of his wife's property, nonetheless, purchases of
"property made by the wife of an insolvent debtor during coverture are justly regarded with suspicion,
unless it clearly appears that the consideration was paid out of her separate estate .... In a contest
between the creditors of the husband and the wife, there is, and there should be, a presumption against
her which she must overcome by affirmative proof").
296. See, e.g., John C. Schneider & Son v. Garland, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 350 (1882) (holding that
married woman could not contract for supplies for support of her family so as to bind herself
individually or her separate estate); McDermott Bros. v. Garland, 12 D.C. (I Mackey) 496 (1882)
(holding that married woman could not bind herself or her estate to pay for a carriage to be used by
woman in attending to her property).
297. Act of June 1, 1896, ch. 303, 29 Stat. 193.
298. Wills v. Jones, 13 App. D.C. 482, 493 (1898). On the creation of the D.C. Court of Appeals, see
supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
299. Wills, 13 App. D.C. at 496-97.
300. Capital Traction Co. v. Rockwell, 17 App. D.C. 369, 379 (1901) (recognizing the right of
married woman to sue for negligence in her own name, without requiring that her husband join suit).
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In the drive to gain the vote for women nationally, particularly from the start
of 1917 running into 1918, suffragists picketed outside the White House almost
daily. 30' Though their picketing was peaceful, they attracted crowds that often
turned hostile. Arrests were common; charges against the picketers included "unlaw-
ful assembly," "obstructing traffic," "disorderly conduct," "assembling in a public
park without a permit," and, when suffragists burned President Wilson's books in
Lafayette Park, "starting bonfires between sunset and sunrise. 30 2 When six suffrag-
ists appealed their convictions for unlawful assembly to the D.C. Court of
Appeals, Justice Charles Robb asked this testing question:
Suppose some [followers] of Billy Sunday should go out on the streets with
banners on which were painted some of Billy's catch phrases, and should
stand with their backs to the fence. A curious crowd gathered, some of whom
created disorder and threw stones at the carriers of the banners. Who should
get arrested, those who created the disorder, or the banner carriers?
30 3
Government counsel was uncertain, but the court was not. On March 4, 1918,
Chief Justice Constantine J. Smyth, joined by Justices Robb and Van Orsdel,
declared the arrest of the women illegal and reversed their convictions.
One indomitable suffragist, who years later ascended to the District's federal
judiciary, had a technique for avoiding the attention of police officers. Burnita
Shelton Matthews, a gentle young woman from Mississippi, was a weekend
picketer.305 During the week, she attended law school classes at night and
worked at the Veterans Administration by day.30 6 In a 1985 interview, years
after her retirement from long service as a U.S. district judge in the District of
Columbia, she said of her protest activity, "You could go to the front of the
White House, and you could carry a banner, but if you spoke you were arrested
for speaking without a permit .... So, if the press or anyone else asked me why
I was there, I didn't answer., 3 0 7 The suffrage banner she carried declared her
purpose. And no arrest record impeded either her admission to the bar or her
301. These protests were not the first by the suffragists, but they were the most intense and most
effective. See INFZ HAYNFS IRWIN, THE STORY OF ALICE PAUL AND THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY 203
(1964). The suffragists also marched in front of Congress on occasion. The first picket line outside the
White House appeared on January 10, 1917; the last, a year and one-half later. Between those dates,
more than a thousand women held lettered banners, accompanied by the purple, white, and gold
tri-colors of the Suffragist movement, at the White House gates or in front of the Capitol. Id.
302. At first, picketers were jailed for a few days, but as the demonstrations continued, sentences
rose to as much as sixty days in the District workhouse in Occoquan, Virginia. tNEZ HAYNFS IRWIN,
UPHILL WITH BANNERS FLYING 267-68 (1964); MoRRis, supra note 2, at 73.
303. IRWIN, supra note 302, at 267. Charles Robb was the father of Roger Robb, a judge from 1969
until 1985 on the successor court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
304. Hunter v. District of Columbia, 47 App. D.C. 406, 409-10 (1918) (holding that the indictment
failed to allege an unlawful purpose for the gathering).
305. Judge Burnita Shelton Matthews: Leader of Women's Rights Movement Recalls Suffrage Fight
and Appointment to Bench, THIRD BRANCH, Mar. 1985, at 3, 6 (1985) (interview with Judge Matthews).
306. Id.
307. Id.
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appointment to the D.C. District Court in 1949 as the first female Article III trial
in 308court judge in the nation.
Also noteworthy among early twentieth-century cases were challenges to
legislation intended to improve working conditions. The Supreme Court's now
infamous 1905 "liberty of contract" decision, Lochner v. New York,3 ° 9 precluded
protection for all workers. 3 '0 Reformers thereafter rallied around a half-a-loaf
strategy-a "women and children first" approach. If a minimum wage law for
women could survive, reformers thought, extension of the law to men would
eventually take hold. In line with that strategy, Congress, in 1918, passed a
minimum wage law for the District covering women and minors only.3 11 The
D.C. Children's Hospital and Willie Lyons, a woman who had worked as an
elevator operator at the Congress Hotel but lost her job to a man who could
lawfully be paid less, brought separate suits to declare the law unconstitu-
tional.3 12 Unsuccessful in the trial court, the complainants prevailed in their
consolidated appeal. Writing for the majority, in typical Lochner style, Justice
Van Orsdel held that the law interfered with the plaintiffs' freedom to contract:
No greater calamity could befall the wage-earners of this country than to have
the legislative power to fix wages upheld. It would deprive them of the most
sacred safeguard which the Constitution affords. Take from the citizen the
right to freely contract and sell his labor for the highest wage which his
individual skill and efficiency will command, and the laborer would be
reduced to an automaton-a mere creature of the state. It is paternalism in the
highest degree, and the struggle of the centuries to establish the principle that
the state exists for the citizen, and not the citizen for the state, would be lost.
If, in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare, power lies in
the Legislature to fix the wage which the citizen must accept, or choose
idleness .... it is but a step to a legal requirement that the industrious, frugal,
economical citizen must divide his earnings with his indolent, worthless
neighbor. The modem tendency toward indiscriminate legislative and judicial
jugglery with great fundamental principles of free government, whereby
property rights are being curtailed and destroyed, logically will, if persisted
in, end in social disorder and revolution. Let no one imagine for a moment
that our civilization is such that property rights can thus be socialized without
308. Ginsburg & Brill, supra note 67, at 284.
309. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
310. Id. at 61, 64 (holding unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds a state law regulating
working hours).
311. Act of Sept. 19, 1918, ch. 174, 40 Stat. 960.
312. After implementation of the law, minimum pay for female hotel and hospital workers was set at
34.50 per hour. Before passage of the so-called protective measure, Ms. Lyons had been earning $35
per month and two meals per day. The new minimum wage law set her pay at $71.50 per month.
Instead of doubling Ms. Lyons's compensation, the hotel protected its purse by replacing her with a
man who would and lawfully could work for a lower wage. Children's Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 618
(D.C. Cir. 1922).
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the grossest abuse of the privileges granted, or that the restraint of the abuses
can be left with safety to legislative or judicial discretion. 3 13
The case elicited an equally passionate dissent from Chief Justice Smyth. The
right of employer and worker to contract, in his view, did not trump official
action taken to promote public health, safety, morals, and welfare:
[I]t is urged that the act is invalid because it interferes with freedom of
contract. That it does so must be conceded, but that is not fatal. Every statute
exerting the police power interferes with freedom of contract.... If it be
correct that the statute is void on that ground, there would be no room for the
play of the police power. But, obviously, it cannot be correct. ".... Liberty
implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community." The
right to make contracts "is subject also.., to the essential authority of
government to maintain peace and security, and to enact laws for the promo-
tion of the health, safety, morals, and welfare of those subject to its jurisdiction." 3 14
Applying that test, Smyth concluded:
It appears to me conclusively that a minimum wage has a real and substantial
relation to the health and morals of women and minor girls who work, and
that Congress, by providing for the establishment of such a wage in the
manner outlined in the statute, has not acted arbitrarily. .. ,but clearly within
the limits of the police power with which it is intrusted.3 15
Both sides had a point. Wages below the prescribed minimum kept workers
impoverished. As Willie Lyons's case indicated, however, protective labor laws
applicable only to women could end up protecting men's jobs from women's
competition. The Supreme Court spoke next, agreed with the majority, and
affirmed in Adkins v. Children's Hospital.3 16 Ultimately, however, Chief Justice
Smyth's dissenting view prevailed. In 1937, the Supreme Court turned away
from "liberty to contract" reasoning and overruled Adkins in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish,3 17 a decision presaging the demise of Lochner.
On the contentious issue of abortion, the D.C. District Court was one of the
313. Id. at 623.
314. Id. at 632 (Smyth, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v.
McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567, 568 (1911)).
315. Id. at 638.
316. 261 U.S. 525, 552-53 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage legislation for women on substan-
tive due process grounds and distinguishing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), which upheld a
statute establishing maximum working hours for women).
317. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding Washington State statute establishing minimum wage for
women); see also Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (upholding unanimously state statute fixing
minimum fee that employment agency could collect from employees and explicitly embracing Justice
Holmes's dissenting views in Lochner); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (upholding a right-to-work law that prohibited closed shops and explaining
that the Court had abandonded the "Lochner... constitutional doctrine").
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first courts in the country to find an antiabortion statute unconstitutional.31 8 In
1969, a D.C. physician, Dr. Milan Vuitch, challenged his indictment under a 1901
provision of the D.C. Code that made it a felony to perform an abortion, except when
necessary to preserve the woman's life or health.31 9 Judge Gerhard Gesell held the
law unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define the term "health"; specifically,
the provision did not indicate whether the exception to the abortion ban encompassed
mental as well as physical health.320 Judge Gesell dismissed the indictment,32' and the
United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
By the time the Supreme Court considered the appeal in United States v.
Vuitch,322 Judge Joseph C. Waddy, in an intervening case, had interpreted the
health exception to include both mental and physical health.323 Relying on that
opinion and its affirmance by the D.C. Circuit,324 the Supreme Court reversed
Vuitch: "[Since the courts below have] construed the [D.C.] statute to permit
abortions 'for mental health reasons whether or not the patient had a previous
history of mental defects' . . . [, w]e see no reason why this interpretation of the
statute should not be followed. ' 325 The statute was no longer vague; abortions
to protect a woman's mental and physical health were lawful, but nontherapeu-
tic abortions remained unlawful.326 Mental health as a reason for abortion,
however, was a major development. Given that escape hatch, any woman of
means or sophistication could get an abortion. In other words, post-Vuitch, the
situation became essentially what it is today-effectively only poor women are
denied free choice.327
318. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (D.D.C. 1969). In an earlier ruling also in
1969, the California Supreme Court struck down an 1850 California statute that prohibited abortions
unless performed to preserve the physical or mental health of the woman. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d
954, 973-74 (1969). In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the California court relied on U.S.
Supreme Court precedent recognizing a "right of privacy" in matters relating to marriage, family, and
reproduction. Id. at 963.
319. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. at 1033. Violators faced up to ten years in prison. Id.
320. Id. at 1034. Dr. Vuitch had moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague and that women have a due process constitutional right to an abortion with
which the statute interfered. Judge Gesell did not rule on the due process plea, but noted that "[t]he
asserted constitutional right of privacy, here the unqualified right to refuse to bear children, has
limitations. Congress can undoubtedly regulate abortion practice in many ways, perhaps even establish-
ing different standards at various phases of pregnancy." Id. at 1035.
321. Id. at 1036.
322. 402 U.S. 62 (1971). The United States appealed under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1970), which allowed direct appeals to the Supreme Court from district court judgments "in all
criminal cases . . . dismissing any indictment.. . where such decision... is based upon the invalidity
... of the statute upon which the indictment.., is founded." Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 64 (omissions in
original) (quoting § 373 1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
323. Doe v. Gen. Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 1170, 1174-75 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 434 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
324. Gen. Hosp., 434 F.2d at 427.
325. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 71-72 (quoting Gen. Hosp., 313 F. Supp. at 1174-75).
326. Id. at 72-73. Noting that the lower court had ruled only on the vagueness ground, the Supreme
Court did not address Dr. Vuitch's privacy arguments.
327. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,
63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 377, 383-86 (1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1201 & n.149 (1992).
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Years after Roe v. Wade,328 the District's federal courts considered the issue
of abortion in the context of restrictions on the use of federal funds by foreign
grantees of U.S. family aid, a matter generating conflict to this day. In DKT
Memorial Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for International Development,329 District Judge
June L. Green declared unconstitutional a provision that prohibited foreign
grantees from expending federal funds on abortion-related services or providing
such services even if funded by private sources. 330 But the D.C. Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge David Sentelle, found no First Amendment violation and
reversed.33' Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, reasoning that the federal
agency distributing U.S. funds had unconstitutionally used the power of its
purse to restrain privately funded speech and association rights of domestic
organizations engaged in family-planning work overseas.33 2
The D.C. courts contributed importantly to the sound interpretation of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963333 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 334 In
one of the longest running employment discrimination cases in this or any other
circuit, Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,3  female flight attendants sued
Northwest Airlines under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.3 3 6 Women were
assigned to an all-female category designated "stewardess"; men who signed on
for cabin duty worked in a better-paying job classification called "purser. 337
Men, but not women, were given an allowance for cleaning their uniforms, were
allowed to wear eyeglasses, and could carry luggage of their own choice aboard
flights.338 Male attendants, without regard to length of service, ranked higher
than female attendants aboard a plane.339 Women of a certain height were
excluded; men of the same height were not. Women, but not men, had to weigh
in and could be grounded if their weight became too great.34° Stewardesses, but
not pursers, had to double up in hotel rooms on layovers. 341 District Judge
Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. held that Northwest Airlines had violated both Acts; he
ordered both injunctive relief and back pay.342 On appeal, Judge Spottswood
Robinson, joined by Judges Bazelon and Tamm, affirmed the district court's
328. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
329. 691 F. Supp. 394 (D.D.C. 1998).
330. Id. at 405.
331. DKT Mem'l Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 E2d 275, 287-90 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
332. Id. at 299 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court later agreed with the majority. See
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-202 (1991) (upholding as compatible with First Amendment a ban
on any involvement by Title X projects in abortion-related activities).
333. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
334. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(l) (1994).
335. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
336. Id. at 430. Commenced in the summer of 1970, the case did not end until certiorari was denied
in 1985. See infra note 347.
337. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F Supp. 763, 765 (D.D.C. 1973).
338. Id. at 774-75.
339. Id. at 775.
340. Id. at 773-74.
341. Id. at 774.
342. Id. at 789-90.
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judgment in principal part.34 3 But Northwest Airlines fought on, appealing each
district court loss. 34 4 The third appeal prompted a strong per curiam opinion by
Judges Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Bork, and Starr, in which the appeals court solidly
reaffirmed the prior determinations that Northwest Airlines had violated both
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.345 The authors of the comprehensive per
curian expressed the hope that their opinion would be "the court's closing
chapter in this nearly fourteen-year-old controversy., 34 6 It was. In 1985, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari and the long saga finally ended.347 The class
action plaintiffs had prevailed, gaining monetary and injunctive relief, large in
dollars, sweep, and precedential value.3 48
While the Laffey litigation was underway, female "bindery workers" sued the
Government Printing Office (GPO) for paying them less than it paid male
"bookbinders" for similar work.34 9 Judge Charles R. Richey held that the GPO
had violated both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.350 The court of appeals
affirmed.35' Its opinion, by Judge Mikva, advanced the Laffey holding that, to
trigger the Equal Pay Act, jobs need not be identical.352 The appeals court
further held that Title VII prohibits treating comparable gender-segregated
positions differently for training and promotion purposes.3 53 Together, the
decisions in Laffey and the GPO case delineated a middle way to construe the
1963 Act's equal-pay-for-equal-work requirement: Equal pay is commanded
when jobs are "substantially equal"-a standard less stringent than "nearly the
same" but more demanding than "comparable" broadly viewed.35 4
Employment discrimination cases pursued by women in the District's federal
courts span a wide range, both factually and legally. In Walker v. Jones,35 5 for
example, Anne Walker complained that, in 1982, she was terminated from her
post as manager of the House of Representatives' restaurants because the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Services of the Committee on House Admin-
343. The court of appeals stated that "the [stewardess/purser] contrast in pay is a consequence of the
historical willingness of women to accept inferior financial rewards for equivalent work[-]precisely
the outmoded practice which the Equal Pay Act sought to eradicate." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
567 F.2d 436, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Because the appeals court disagreed with certain remedial aspects
of the district court's judgment, it remanded for reconsideration. Id. at 473-78.
344. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 642 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
345. Laffey, 740 F.2d at 1075.
346. Id.
347. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 472 U.S. 1021 (1985).
348. Laffey, 740 F.2d at 1103.
349. Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp. 1147, 1150 (D.D.C. 1979).
350. Id. at 1167.
351. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
352. Id. at 271-72.
353. Id. at 292. Judge Roger Robb dissented in part; he objected to the retroactive imposition of
remedies for offenses predating the laws' application to the federal government. Id. at 296 (Robb, J.,
dissenting in part).
354. Thompson, 678 F.2d at 270.
355. 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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istration thought her salary, $45,000 annually, was "ridiculous for a woman., 356
Ms. Walker's due process and equal protection claims were met by a defense of
blanket immunity under the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause.35 7 The
defendants' pleas succeeded in the district court,358 but the court of appeals
reversed.359 In an opinion by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Judge
Wilkey, the court acknowledged that the Speech or Debate Clause comprehen-
sively shields activity relating to lawmaking.360 But auxiliary services, such as
parking, haircut shops, and food facilities, can and should be cordoned off from
the legislative milieu:
The Speech or Debate Clause... does not impregnably shield from court
consideration allegedly unconstitutional personnel actions taken in the course
of managing congressional food service facilities.
... Selecting, supervising, and discharging a food facilities manager, we
believe, is not reasonably described as work that significantly informs or
influences the shaping of our nation's laws.3 6'
Another long-held defense failed in Owens v. Brown,362 a class action suit in
which Navy women challenged the constitutionality of Congress's ban on the
assignment of female personnel to sea duty aboard Navy vessels.36 3 It is a
military matter, the United States urged, so the judgment of Congress should not
be second guessed by the judiciary. Judge Sirica found that response inad-
equate.364 His final judgment ordered no radical changes. He simply directed
the Navy to "move forward in measured steps" toward the integration of
shipboard crews; if problems arose in integrating crews, they could be handled
356. Id. at 926 (internal quotation marks omitted).
357. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not
be questioned in any other Place.").
358. Walker v. Jones, 557 F. Supp. 366, 367-68 (D.D.C. 1983). Ms. Walker sued Ed Jones,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Services of the Committee on House Administration, and Tom
Marshall, Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Services, claiming that her firing violated her Fifth
Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. See Walker, 733 F.2d at 925. At the time of the
Walker litigation, the federal laws against employment discrimination did not apply to Congress. They
were extended to the national legislature some years later in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 117, 105 Stat. 1071, 1080-81 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 601(2000)).
359. Walker, 733 F.2d at 933-34.
360. Id. at 928-29.
361. Id. at 925, 931. Judge MacKinnon dissented in part and concurred in part, adopting a more
expansive reading of the immunity secured by the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 934-35 (MacKin-
non, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Jones v. Walker,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
362. 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978). The defendants were Harold Brown, the Secretary of Defense,
and W. Graham Claytor, the Secretary of the Navy.
363. Id. at 294. Women were allowed on hospital ships and transports.
364. Id. at 299.
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through appropriate training and planning. 365 The Navy did not fight on; it took
the measured steps and did not appeal the district court's decision.
The D.C. federal courts were leaders in recognizing that sexual harassment was
gender discrimination remediable under Title VII. Paulette Barnes brought the first
case.3 66 She sued her employer, the Environmental Protection Agency, for sex discrimi-
nation alleging that her job was terminated when she refused to comply with the
sexual demands of her supervisor.367 District Judge John Lewis Smith dismissed the
suit, concluding that sexual harassment did not constitute sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII.3 6 8 In his view, Ms. Barnes's ill fortune was attributable to "the
subtleties of an inharmonious relationship," not to discrimination based on her sex.
3 69
In a landmark opinion, Barnes v. Costle,3 70 Judge Spottswood Robinson, joined by
Judge Bazelon, held that if Barnes's job was abolished because she repulsed her male
supervisor's sexual advances, the superior's conduct did indeed constitute sex discrimi-
nation proscribed by Title VII.3 7 1 The appeals court explained that if the plaintiff's
allegations proved true, the supervisor had harassed Ms. Barnes because she was a
woman, thus imposing on her a condition of employment "he would not have
fastened on a male employee. ' 372 Judge MacKinnon agreed that sexual harassment
may be a violation of Title VII, but wrote separately to state his narrower view of
employer liability for coworker violations.
373
In a noteworthy post-Barnes case, Sandra Bundy objected to what District
Judge George L. Hart, Jr. described as a work environment in which "making
... sexual advances to female employees [was] standard operating procedure, a
fact of life, a normal condition of employment. 374 Judge Hart nonetheless
denied relief. Sexual harassment, without more, does not constitute discrimina-
tion within the meaning of Title VII.375 The court of appeals reversed. 376 In an
opinion by Judge Wright, joined by Judges Spottswood Robinson and Luther
M. Swygert, the D.C. Circuit concluded that an employer violates Title VII by
subjecting female employees to sexual harassment, even when the resisting
employee lost no tangible job benefits.3 77
365. Id. at 310.
366. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974).
367. Barnes sued under Title VII, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994)), which
extended the statute's prohibition of discrimination to state, local, and federal government employers.
368. Barnes, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 124.
369. Id.
370. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
371. Id. at 995.
372. Id. at 990 n.49.
373. Id. at 995, 999 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Perhaps Judge MacKinnon was beginning to be
influenced by his daughter's views. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
374. Bundy v. Jackson, No. 77-1359, 1979 WL 197, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1979).
375. Id. at *6.
376. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
377. Id. at 945-46, 953 (remanding for further evidentiary proceedings). Judge Swygert, from the
Seventh Circuit, was sitting by designation. For discussion of the Barnes and Bundy cases, see Steven
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Mechelle Vinson's case came up while Sandra Bundy's was in progress.
Vinson, then employed at Meritor Bank, accused her supervisor and the bank of
violating Title VII based on the supervisor's alleged coercion of a sexual
relationship, which Vinson had endured for several years.378 District Judge John
G. Penn, ruling before the court of appeals decided Bundy, found no violation;
the plaintiff had not lost her job or suffered any other economic lOSS. 37 9
Moreover, any sexual encounter, if it occurred, Judge Penn suggested, was
"voluntary. ' '380 Again, the court of appeals reversed, in an opinion by Judge
Spottswood Robinson, joined by Judges Wright and Northrop. 381 The allowance
of an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment, the court said,
suffices to establish a Title VII violation; physical coercion or economic loss is
not a necessary ingredient.382 A violation of Title VII may be predicated on
either of two types of harassment: (1) the conditioning of employment benefits
on sexual favors, so-called quid pro quo harassment; and (2) the creation of a
hostile or offensive working environment, even when not attended by adverse
economic consequences.3 8 3 Because Ms. Vinson's grievance was of the second
type and the district court had not considered whether a violation of that genre
had occurred, a remand was necessary.384 The Supreme Court agreed. In its first
sexual harassment decision, captioned Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,385 the
Supreme Court affirmed the essence of Judge Robinson's opinion.386 A hostile
work environment, if sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect "a term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment," is discrimination based on sex within Title
VII's compass; detrimental economic effects are not essential.387 Regarding
Judge Penn's conclusion that no claim lay because Vinson's response was
"voluntary," the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals: The correct
inquiry is whether the sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether the
S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing Sexual Harassment of
Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383 (1996).
378. Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10676, at *20 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980).
379. Id. at *20-*23.
380. Id. at *20.
381. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Judge Edward S. Northrop, from the
District Court of Maryland, was sitting by designation. For evaluation of the D.C. Circuit's work in the
area of sexual harassment, see Locke, supra note 377, at 390.
382. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 144, 146, 150 n.68.
383. Id. at 144, 146, 150.
384. The court denied a motion for rehearing en banc, Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (en banc) (per curiam), with a dissenting opinion by Judge Bork, joined by Judges Scalia and
Starr. Id. at 1331 (Bork, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
385. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
386. Id. at 73.
387. Id. at 63-64. The Supreme Court did not agree with the court of appeals regarding the
admissibility of the testimony concerning the provocative nature of the plaintiff's attire or the absolute
liability of an employer for harassment by a supervisor. Id. at 58. But the Supreme Court did agree that
the existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with the plaintiff's
failure to invoke the grievance procedure, did not necessarily insulate the employer from liability. Id. at 67, 73.
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employee's participation was, in some sense, voluntary.388
In sum, for much of their history, the D.C. federal courts were not pathbreakers, but
the cases they adjudicated occasionally yielded powerful dissents that eventually
became prevailing law.389 During some periods, perhaps most notably in the 1960s
and 1970s, the D.C. Circuit played a conspicuously active part in endeavors to secure
genuinely equal rights and opportunities for the vulnerable populations that came
before it. Complementing the cases discussed above involving African-Americans
and women, the court of appeals responded to pleas on behalf of the poor and the
infirm. For example, the D.C. Circuit invoked the unconscionability clause of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) to stop the Walker-Thomas furniture store from
repossessing all the purchases of Mrs. Williams when she defaulted on one of her very
last payments.390 The D.C. Circuit was one of the first courts to so employ the UCC.
The court reacted similarly to the plight of impecunious tenants captive to overbearing
landlords391 and held that persons involuntarily committed to a mental institution in
the District have a statutory right to "adequate treatment. ' '392 While these courts have
388. Id. at 69. In two subsequent cases, coming from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, the
Supreme Court decided that employers can be vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of
employees in both quid pro quo and hostile work environment cases. See Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) rev'g 76 F. 3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1996); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) aff'g Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F. 3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
389. In addition to the cases already described, judges of the D.C. Circuit authored some prescient
dissents when the Red Scare produced a variety of governmental efforts to test the loyalty of
Americans. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 233 F.2d 681, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Edgerton, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 354 U.S. 178, 216 (1957); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 66-74 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
(Edgerton, J., dissenting), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Barsky v. United
States, 167 F.2d 241, 252-63 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
390. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (invoking
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1962)).
391. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Javins, tenants,
threatened with eviction for failure to pay rent, claimed they were entitled to withhold rent in light of
numerous violations of the D.C. housing code. Id. at 1073. Reversing the lower court's rejection of the
defense, the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Wright, discarded the common-law rule that a lease
primarily conveys an interest in land and contains no implied warranty that the premises are fit for
occupancy. Such a rule, according to the court, though reasonable in a rural, agrarian society, is no
longer appropriate for the modern apartment dweller. Contract law, not property law, should govern
leases for urban dwelling units. Id. at 1074-75. The court held that a warranty of habitability, measured
by the standard established in the D.C. housing regulations, is implied in all leases of urban dwellings
covered by those regulations. Breach of such a warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of
contract, including suspension of a tenant's obligation to pay rent. Id. at 1080-82. In Edwards v. Habib,
397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), a tenant protested her eviction, claiming it was in retaliation for her
complaining to the District of more than forty violations of the D.C. Code. The D.C. Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Wright, reversed the lower court's rejection of her defense:
In light of the appalling condition and shortage of housing in Washington, the expense of
moving, the inequality of bargaining power between tenant and landlord, and the social and
economic importance of assuring at least minimum standards in housing conditions, we do not
hesitate to declare that retaliatory eviction cannot be tolerated.
Id. at 701 (footnotes omitted).
392. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Rouse, an eighteen-year-old tried for
carrying a dangerous weapon, a misdemeanor for which maximum imprisonment was one year, was
found not guilty by reason of insanity, confined in St. Elizabeth's Hospital, and held under maximum
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become less pathbreaking in recent years, they remain mindful of Judge Wright's
exhortation of Dr. Seuss's gentle maxim: "A person's a person, no matter how
small."
3 9 3
CONCLUSION
The federal courts of the District of Columbia are unique because of their
location in the Capital City and their special competence to review actions of
officialdom. For two centuries, they have adjudicated cases of great and grave
consequence to the nation's well-being. They have also participated promi-
nently in the evolution of the concept "We, the People" to encompass all who
dwell in this land, including those once excluded, ignored, or undervalued. The
judges of these courts, in many pathmarking cases, have been willing to stand
up for the weak and to stare down the powerful, even, when necessary, the
President of the United States. The mission of these courts remains as Chief
Judge Cranch described it in 1837. Of the circuit court that once comprised the
District's main trial and appellate tribunals, Cranch wrote:
This Court has the power to call before it every person found in the district,
from the highest to the lowest; and it is upon this power that [the president,
vice-president, heads of departments, other officers of government, foreign
ministers, local inhabitants, visitors to the seat of government, as well as the
citizens and inhabitants of the district] depend for that protection which the
law extends over them. 394
On this two-hundredth anniversary, we applaud these courts for their part in
carrying out the responsibility defined by Chief Justice John Marshall: To say
what the law is and to enforce it.39 5
security for three years. Rouse petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming he had
received no treatment. The district judge denied relief, saying he did not have jurisdiction to consider
whether petitioner was getting sufficient treatment. Id. at 452. A divided court of appeals, in an opinion
by Chief Judge Bazelon, reversed and remanded for a hearing on whether Rouse was receiving
adequate treatment, finding that a person involuntarily committed to a mental hospital has a statutory
right to treatment, cognizable in habeas corpus, under the newly enacted D.C. Hospitalization and
Mentally IIl Act. Id. at 451, 458-59 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (Supp. V 1966)). In Lake v.
Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc), the petitioner, a woman in her sixties who was
"somewhat senile .... ha[d] a poor memory, ha[d] wandered on a few occasions, and [was] unable to
care for herself at all times," id. at 662 (Wright, J., concurring), had been confined in St. Elizabeth's
Hospital as an insane person. Lake, 364 F.2d at 658. Invoking the D.C. Hospitalization and Mentally Ill
Act, the court found that Ms. Lake had a statutory right, cognizable through habeas corpus, not to be
deprived of her liberty beyond what is necessary for her own protection; it therefore ordered the district
court to explore "alternative courses of treatment." Id. at 661.
Turbulent issues of criminal justice also figured importantly in the D.C. federal courts' decisionmaking. See,
e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (defining insanity); United States v. Brawner, 471
F2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (adopting Model Penal Code standard for insanity).
393. Wright, supra note 182, at 118 (quoting SEUSS, supra note 182, at 6).
394. United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, 5 D.C. (5 Cranch) 163, 188 (1837).
395. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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